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ABSTRACT
Who are Kosova/o and thek majority population? What are main problems in 
Kosova/o case? Have Kosova/o and its majority population the right to self- 
determination, meaning independent statehood as the former Yugoslav republics? 
What treatment has had Kosova/o and its majority population under the Titoite 
(Communist) Yugoslavia? What impact has Kosova/o crisis in the region? The legal- 
political of the Kosovar claims? These are some of the core issues we have discussed 
here which enabled us to fully understand Kosova/o overview.
Ill
ÖZET
Kosova kimdir ve oradaki nüfus çoğunluğu kimdir? Kosova probleminde olan 
sonunlar nelerdir'!' Kosova ve oradaki çoğunluk nüfus önceki Yugoslav 
Cumhuriyetlerde olduğu gibi bağımsızlık anlamına gelen kendi geleceğine karar 
verme hakkına sahip miydi? Kosova’nm Tito (Komünist) Yugoslavya’sındaki 
durum neydi? Kosova krizinin bölgedeki etkisi nedir? Kosovalı’nm yasal-politik 
iddialarının temeli nedir? Bunlar bizim tam olarak Kosova’yı anlamamızı sağlayan 
tartıştığımız temel konulardır.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The dissolution of former Yugoslavia was the largest and the most difficult process in 
Europe after the Cold War. A part of its dissolution process ended with the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, but other part, the most difficult, Kosova/o remained unsolved. Kosova/o 
was the first problem of former Yugoslavia by the time it broke-up. Yet it had been 
neglected by all parties. The situation in Kosova/o, especially over the last years, was 
very grave not only for Albanian-Serb sides, but also for the whole international 
community. Kosova/o in 1999 became the main problem on the international arena, the 
main one after the Second World War, and the fftst test of the international community in 
resolving disputes after the Cold War.
The aim of this dissertation was to make one overview about Kosova/o, its people, and 
the very roots of the problem, finding proper solution to the problem and its impact on 
the Balkan region also captures one of this dissertation interest.. In the beginning we 
describe shortly the history of Kosova/o from the ancient time to the Second World War. 
In this chapter we find the facts of authoctony of Albanians, as one of the oldest peoples 
in the Balkans, and the oldest ones in the Kosova/o territory as descendants of Illyrians.
Some space is devoted to the Ottoman Empire and its domination over the region. 
During that time, the Albanians resisted and cooperated with, the Ottomans. They 
survived that time together with other Balkan nations. The beginnings of XIX century 
and the Balkan Wars are the most marked years of Albanian history. Those wars are the 
main causes of today’s sufferings of Kosovars. They created the circumstances for the 
division of Albanians into many states, a huge part remaining under Serbian occupation. 
From that time until today, the Albanian people of Kosova/o have made attempts to 
reunite and fought for equal status with other peoples in the region. The result of this 
division, also confirmed by the international factors of that time, was the expulsion, 
killing and colonization of their territory by the Kingdom of Serbs-Croats-Slovenes. 
Albanians under that Kingdom were not treated either as a people or as a national 
minority.
The Second World War was the turning point for whole world as well as for the 
Albanians. This period and its events are discussed in the Chapter III of the thesis. The 
occupation of former Yugoslavia, including Kosova/o, was an event for Albanians that 
they welcomed . For the first time new occupation gave them a chance to enjoy the 
national rights, schools etc.
Unfortunately, after the Second World War Kosova/o remained under Communist 
Yugoslavia. Sufferings remained the same as before the World War Two. Communist
Yugoslavia did not solve the Kosova/o issue. Instead it complicated the issue even more 
as it happened with other Socialist countries whereby various national communities were 
put under the tight control of bigger nations.
Under the Communist { Titoite) Yugoslavia, though, Kosova/o gradually improved its 
position. After the fall of Rankovic, Kosova/o emerged as a new subject. Chapter III 
deals with this extensively. As a province, it gained large autonomous based on territory 
and political autonomy. The 1974 Constitution is especially treated whereby Kosova/o 
became almost an independent unit of former Yugoslavia. This status of Kosova/o was to 
be considered by Serbia a defeat. After Tito's death Yugoslavia began falling apart 
gradually.
First attempt for destruction of the balance created by the 1974 Constitution was made in 
1989 when Kosova/o lost its autonomy. This marked the first step of Serbian nationalists, 
led by Milosevic, towards the destruction of Communist Yugoslavia. Other units of the 
federation did not grasp Milosevic's aim immediately. Instead, they supported him in 
achieving this. Shortly after Kosova/o, Serbian nationalists clarified their ideas and 
aims. These were the direct cause, together with other international developments, for the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia.
The dissolution of Yugoslavia was the most proper time for the Albanians of Kosova/o to
realize iheh· aspirations. The manner and claims of the Kosovars as to the realization of 
theh" national goals are discussed in the Chapter IV. The Kosovars started peacefully to 
realize their aspirations. They undertook some legal actions such as the Constitutional 
Declaration for Equal Status of Kosova/o within the Yugoslav Federation/ Confederation 
and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova/o. Also according to the developments in 
the region of former Yugoslavia they held a Referendum for an independent and 
sovereign state. From 1990 until 1998 they led a peaceful policy setting up pai'allel state 
structures. All of these peaceful activities have been neglected by the Belgrade regime. 
International community did not pay more attention the Kosova/o issue either.
Status-quo in Kosova/o, parallel state activities, life denial of human and national rights, 
the state of no perspective turned them to other ways for solution of their cause. After the 
Dayton Agreement the new factor of political life in Kosova/o appeared, this time in form 
of a military organization- KLA ( UCK in Albanian). KLA gained very large support 
among some of local population and in March 1998, after long time of waiting, armed 
conflict broke out in Kosova/o. After this, the attention of international community was 
focused on Kosova/o. In March 1999, after some unsuccessful attempts to settle the issue 
thi'ough negotiations, NATO began an air strike against FRY for 78 days. That brought 
the peace to Kosova/o and the region as a whole.
A special attention is given to the basis of the claims of Kosova/o for self-determination.
Thus, in Chapter V we discuss the legal-political based of the claim for self- 
determination. This right has its source in historical, legal, democratic and demographic 
facts and reality. To this end, we give an overview of the economic viability of 
Kosova/o as one of the most important conditions for the enjoyment of the right to self- 
determination. The right of Kosova/o to independent statehood can not be realized if it 
poses thi'eat to the regional stability. Because of this we analyze that issue especially 
regarding the FYROM. One part of this chapter is devoted to arguments against 
Kosova/o's independent statehood. Chapter VI is reserved for conclusions regarding 
historical, legal, international and other aspects of the Kosova/o issue.
CHAPTER II: A SHORT HISTORY OF KOSOVA/O
1. A brief Overview on Kosova/o
Kosova/o is situated in the southwest of Balkan Peninsula. It’s one of the smallest 
countries of Europe, not only for its territory but also for the number of its population. 
Kosova has a tenitory of 10.887 km2 and the population of approximately 2.million. 
The population density is among the highest in Europe, i.e. 180 per one km2.'
Kosova has a central geographic position in Balkan Peninsula. Even though a small 
territory, the geographic landscape of Kosova was always of great geopolitical and 
geostrategic importance. The geographic position enables Kosova to have significant 
cross functions among the Panonia basin, Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea. These relevant 
natural given factors make Kosova a Mediterranean country with important functions of 
transit traffic in the Balkan and wider.
Although Kosova/o, has played a central role in the Balkan history, it has remained, 
during much of the history, mysterious and little known to the outsiders. ^
' Ruzhdi Pllana, Veqorite gjeografike. Universiteti I Prishtines (ed). Prishtine, 1999. pp. 5-14. ( In English: 
Ruzhdi Pllana, The Geographic Features. University of Prishtina (ed). Prishtina, 1999. pp. 5-14.)
 ^ Noel Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History. Copyright © Noel Malcolm, 1998.p.l.
Kosova/o has got a continuous geographic position of the ethnic Albanian territories and 
has always had a crucial role on the historical attempt to preserve and integrate the 
national and territorial unity. The overall border length of Kosova with neighboring 
countries is approx.633 km. The borderline goes mainly through the highest mountainous 
quotas, but as to the ethnic aspect that line virtually divides the territories inhabited by 
the Albanians, so that thus its border is not an ethnic one.
The current borders of Kosova are of course the outcomes of a political history. At the 
same time, they correspond more or less to a physical fact. The Kosova borders before 
the break-up of the Former Yugoslavia were interfederal. Kosova borders on the South 
with FR of Macedonia (160 km). It stretches above the Mountains of Shai'i and Karadak. 
On the East and the North, Kosova borders with the Republic of Serbia. The border line 
is 318 km. and represents more then 50 per cent of the total border line.  ^ On the 
Northwest, Kosova/o borders with Montenegro (68 km) and reaches the highest peaks of 
the Albanian Alps. Kosova/o on the West borders with the Republic of Albania, (121-km 
border line) and reaches the highest peaks of the mountains of Shari, Kotornik, Pashtrik 
and the Central part of the Albanian Alps.'^
The sea level in Kosova is 810 m. However, the most extreme sea levels are noted in the 
Valley of Drini i Bardhe near the border with Albania and the Gjeravica Mountain (2.656 
m). The landscape of Kosova is marked on the elementary form of the Dukagjini Valley
■’ R.Pllana, The Geographic Features, pp.5-7. 
“* R.Pllana, The Gographic Features, p.6.
and Kosova/o region, which represent the most important part of the overall economic 
activity. Among them, lies the Drenica region. It also should be noted that 38,4% of the 
Kosova/o area is defforestated.^
Kosova/o has got also rivers and lakes, which play an important role on the water and 
electricity supply. There is net of rivers, just to mention few: Drini i Bai'dhe (The White 
River), Ibri, Sitnica, Morava of Binci and Lepenci. Kosova doesn’t have an access to the 
sea. Kosova is rich with mines such as Trepca, Novoberda, Kishnica, Obiliqi, Volljaka, 
etc. Most important towns of Kosova/o are Prishtina, Mitrovica, Prizreni, Peja, Gjakova, 
Ferizaj and Gjilani. Prishtina is the capital and administrative, economic, politic, cultural, 
educational, scientific and information center of Kosova/o.
Kosova/o has got an ethnic homogenous composition. The majority of the population is 
Albanians, 90 %. Others are Serbs, Turks, Montenegrins, Romas, etc. The Albanian 
people is one of the oldest established population in Europe. European people could be 
less ’’alien” to the history of the Balkans. And no understanding of the Balkan history can 
be complete without the knowledge of the history of the Albanians of Kosova/o.^
The name Albanians (Shqiptaret) originates from the word Shqiponja (EAGLE), which 
may have been the totem of an early tribe. The Albanians are descendants of the 
Illyrians.
The Illyrians lived in today's Albania and most of the former Yugoslavia. Kosova/o itself
' R.Pllana, The Geographic Features. p.l2.
' N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p.xxxvi.
was a part of the tribal land of the Dardanians, who almost certainly belonged to the 
Illyrian grouping. The Albanians of Kosova comprise one third of the Albanians living 
worldwide. Kosova and the Albanians of Kosova are the pillar of the national center of 
the Albanians in the former Yugoslavia. The Albanians of Kosova speak their unique 
language Albanian Language, with the Latin letters unified in 1908 in the Pan-Albanian 
Conference held in Manastir-Macedonia. Nowadays, the Kosovars use standard and 
unified Albanian Language with that used in Albania since 1972.
The Kosovars have two predominant religions; Moslems constitute 90% while others are 
Roman Catholics and very few orthodox. There is no religion based political movement 
among the Albanians. If we look further back into Kosova’s past, we can find many 
examples of mixed religious life.  ^ The Albanians of Kosova today are in many ways a 
pohtically mobilized people, but rehgion has played almost no role at all in that 
mobilization.
In Kosova/o live about 8% Serbs. They have came to Kosova/o when the South Slaves 
moved into the Balkans. They are different from the Albanians, including their origin, 
language, culture and the history. There have been many battles and wars in Kosova/o 
over the centuries, but until the last 100 years or so none of them had the character of an 
’’ethnic” conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs. *  The history among the 
Albanians and the Serbs can be described as a history of conflicts. After the Cold War
’ N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p.xxiii.
* N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History. p.xxix.
and the break-up of former Yugoslavia, the relationship between the Serbs and 
Albanians, or better to say between Kosova/o and Serbia resulted with a war in 1998. 
The situation in Kosova/o in the nineties can be described as the place with the majority 
of Albanians confronting the Serb military and police.^
Other minorities such as Turks, Muslims, Romas, etc. had no impact whatsoever on the 
Kosova/o’s events. Kosova/o nowadays is a name heard time and again in the 
international decision-making centers as a problem which is to be solved.
2. Ancient History. Ottoman period up to the Balkan Wars
The ancient history of Kosova/o, namely the Albanians of Kosova cannot be reviewed 
separately from the Albanians in general. Kosova/o was originally populated by the 
Illyrians, and ancient people, who inhabited the western part of the Balkans from about 
2000 B.C. The earliest known Illyrian king was Hyllus, who died in 1125 B.C. and the 
last was Gentius who was defeated by the Romans in 165 B.C. Modern Albanians are the 
direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians and thus the original inhabitants of Kosova/o.
The Illyrians were scattered in all western parts of the Balkan Peninsula from the north 
of the River Sava, Drava and Danube up to the Ambrakis Bay in the south, and further
'  Gazmend Zajmi, Vepra 1. Akademia e Areteve dhe Shkences se Kosoves. Prishtine, 1997. p.74. ( In 
English: Gazmend Zajmi, Works 1. The Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosova/o. Prishtina, 1997.p.74. 
Gary Dempsey, Kosova Crossfire. "Mediterranen Quarterly" Vol. 9 No. 3 Summer 1998, p.95.
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east up to Morava and Velesh." The Illyrians lived in tribes. The ancient dwellers of 
nowadays Kosova were the Dardans, one among the biggest Illyrian tribes that ever lived 
in the Illyria. Territory dwelled by the Dardans was called Dardania meaning the “Land 
of Pears”. The ancient Dardania was part of Illyria. It included the upper part of the 
Vardari River, the White River, Shari Mountains, the Flow of the River Iber, South and 
Western Morava, Nishava and the Flow of the Timok River. On the heart of this 
tenitory, lies nowadays Kosova.*^ The Albanians are Illyrians on whose land they now
live and whose language they speak. 13
The Albanian people in their ethnic land in the former Yugoslavia and its ethnic territory 
during the history has lived and functioned as an ethnic community with other part of the 
Albanians in the Balkan. The Albanians are in their ethnic and indigenous land and this 
means that they have lived there since the oldest times, since the time when the 
ethnographic processes began in the Balkans. They have formed there their ethnicity and 
have built their national identity. They have defended their national being in this land and 
they want to build their future.*'*
So the Yugoslav Scientist himself, R. Katicic, writing about the territory in which the 
Albanians Language developed from Illirian asserts that the territory corresponds in
“ Fehmi Rexhepi, Kosova gjate historise. Prishtine, 1998.p. 18. ( In English: Fehmi Rexhepi, Kosova 
during history. Prishtina, 1998.p. 18.)
Fehmi Rexhepi, Kosova during history, p.l.
Consult Alexander Stipcevic, “The Question of Illyrian-Albanian Continuity and its Topically Today". 
No. 4 Tirana 1994. Also, Zef Mirdita, Studime Dardane. Prishtine, 1979. ( In English: Zef Mirdita, Studies 
on Dardans. Prishtina, 1979.)
Esat Stavileci, Kosova/o, Political. International and Constitutional Arguments. "Kosova Law Review". 
Prishtina, 1996.p. 19. Also, Alush Gashi, The Denial of Human and National Rights of the Albanians in 
Kosova. Copyright © Ylliria Publishing C. inc. New York, 1992.p.5)
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general outlines to the contemporary state of the Albanians, but it stretches also outside
its borders into Yugoslavia and Greece. 15
The fii'st Slaves appeared around Kosova/o in the late fourth century AD as marauders 
who raided Romanized settlements. By the end of the eight century, the Slaves had 
colonized most of the area of modern (former) Yugoslavia including K osova/o.The 
Slav-speaking people began to migrate to the Balkans only in the early si.xth century. At 
first they came as raiders, but by the seventh century they began to settle. The first Slaves 
cannot be identified as Serbs, Croats or Bulgarians: they were “unidentified”slavs.'^ This 
is in general as regard the settlements of Slavs in the Balkans. However the slaves in 
Kosova settled on the occasion of the Serbian state expansion to this direction by 
Nemanjics.'*  ^ From all the studies and the research conducted, it can be concluded that 
the Albanians occupied the Balkan Peninsula long before the Slavs andved in the seventh
century. 19
The massive settlements of the Slavs in the Balkans, in particular in the Northern Illyria 
brought about big changes in the social and political life as well as in the ethnic balance 
of the population. The arrival of the Slavs overwhelmingly changed the hnguistic 
composition of the peoples of the southern Balkans.^*^
Ratko Katicic, Ancient Language of the Balkans. Paris. 1976.p.l84.
G.Dempsey, Kosovo Crossfire.p.96.
Tim Judah, The Serbs. History. Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. Copyright © 1997 by Tim 
Judah, p.7)
Mark Krasniqi, Obstinate arguments. “ORA” Prishtina. No. 5 1991.p.66
Warren Zimmerman, The Demons of Kosova. "The National Interests" No. 52 Spring, 1998. p.5
F. Rexhepi, Kosova/o during hirostv. p.20.also, Tim Judah, The Serbs..p.8.
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After the Slav invasion into Balkans, the partial process of Ronaanization of the Illyrians 
was replaced by Slavism. After the Slaves settled Illyrian-Albanian territories at the 
beginning of XII century, the Rashka Zhupania was established and consolidated, which 
at the beginning included the Province of Rashka and North Novi Pazai' and Sienica. The 
Serb settled first the area called Rashka. Kosova/o did not fall within the Serb territory of 
Rashka, which was further to the northwest. The Serbian expansion into Kosova/o began 
in the earliest only during the late twelve century. Rashka was the nucleus of the future 
Serbian State.“  In the year 1160 a new Rascian ruling family emerged, which was to 
dominate the history of the region for the next 200 year’s. Its leading founder member 
was called Stefan Nemanja inherited one part of the Rascian territory on the northern 
flank of Kosova/o. Within some years of war, the Rascian expanded the territory in 
Montenegro, Albania, Nishi, Kosova and Macedonia. Near the central Serbian town 
Ki’alevo, the monastery of Zica was founded by Stefan Nemanja. This autocephalus 
Church moved to Peja-Kosova/o in 1250.With the death in 1355 of Tsar Dusan however; 
the Nemnjaic Empire began to designate. Thus the years of Nemanjic rule were the 
extended period of greatness to which Serbs could later look back and from which they 
could draw inspiration.
Ever since the end of XII century and the time when the Turks penetrated in Balkans, the 
territory of Kosova/o was mainly under the Serb rule. During this period, parallel with 
the colonization of Kosova/o, the Serbs in Kosova began to appropriate the churches.
N. Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p.43. 
T.Judah, The Serbs, p.l7.
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monasteries and other worship monuments, by driving out the Albanian religious leaders 
and replacing them with the Serbs instead.
In the second half of XIV century the Ottoman arrhy penetrated in the Balkan Peninsula. 
In the war in Marica in 1371, the Ottomans conquered and penetrated deep in the 
Balkans.The Ottoman rulers imposed their administrative and military system known as 
tamari. One of the most important events of this time is the Battle of Kosova/o, which 
took place near Prishtina on June 28,1989. The fighting was intense and there were heavy 
losses on both sides. Both Lazar and Sultan Murat were killed. At the end of the battle 
the Turks were left in possession of the field. The victory of the Ottoman Empire opened 
new roads for new penetration into the Balkans. Members of two populations Albanians 
and Serbs) fought together as allies on both sides of that battle of Kosova/o in 1389, 
some of them under Prince Lazar and other under Ottoman sultan.^ '*
This battle was used very much in creation of the Serb myth on Kosova, in particular 
after the declaration of the Serb state in the IX century and in the last years of the break­
up of the former Yugoslavia. The significance of this battle to the Serbian people is not 
to be measured simply in terms of politico-strategic consequences. The story of the battle 
of Kosova has become a totem or talisman of the Serbian identity, so that this event has a 
status unlike that of anything else in the history of Serbs.^  ^Eventhough this battle was a 
victory of the Ottoman Empire and the loss for the Serbs, the latter describet as their 
victory. This battle in fact marks the placement of the Ottoman rule over the Balkans and
N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p.xxix. 
N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p.58
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the Albanian lands. The Albanians belonged to the Rumelian Vilayet divided into ten 
Sandjaks (in Turkish meaning provinces). Ever since the Turks penetrated into the 
Balkans and up to XIX century, the most of the Kosova/o was under the Vushtrri
Sandjak. 26
The Ottoman Government for the Balkans in its early days formed a well regulated 
system of rule, and the conditions of life it produced could be compared favorably in 
many ways with those of Europe." The main difference, however between the Ottoman 
system and its predecessors was that the feudal status of the peasants underwent a real 
improvement. For at least the first century of Ottoman rule, rural life in Kosova/o seems 
to have flourished.
The Ottoman .Rulers were well aware of the economic value of the mines of Kosova/o. 
The only towns contracting during this period were the ones dependent on mines such as 
Novo Berdo.^® At this time starts the expansion of the Muslim religion. The growth of 
Islam in Kosova/o during the early Ottoman period, was almost exclusively urban 
phenomenon.^^ Whilst the position of ordinary Catholics in Kosova/o had deteriorated 
during this period, one thing which had significantly improved was the organization of 
the Church itself.
30
F. Rexhepi, Kosova/o During historv.p.22. 
N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History. p.91. 
N.Malcolm. Kosovo A Short History, pp. 105-137. 
N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p. 105. 
N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History. p.l24.
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During this period there were some uprising against the Turkish rule. The biggest 
resistance was organized by Skanderbeg between the years 1443-1468.Skanderbeg was 
to keep resistance to Ottoman force for an extraordinary twenty-five years, until his death 
in 1468.There were also many local revolts, some of them in or near the Kosova/o 
territory.Similarly, there was a revolt of 1560 in the Peja area led by Pjeter Bogdani.
In the second half of the XVII century, the state of the population deteriorated. This fact 
was availed by the Habsburg Empire which called the Balkan people to fight against the 
Ottoman Empire.The Ottoman-Habsburg war of 1683-99 make some of the turning 
points in the European history. For the history of Kosova/o, this war has a very special 
significance. In the autumn of 1689 a small imperial army invaded Kosova/o, drove off 
the local Ottoman forces and established Austrian control over the whole area. Some of 
the inhabitants of Kosova/o pledged their loyalty to the Austrian Emperior. But in the 
first days of 1690, the Austrian hastily withdrew and the mixed Ottoman and Tartar army 
poured into Kosova/o again.
During its rule, the Ottoman Empire made some reforms, which had the objective, to 
incorporate of the population into their own system. The biggest reform to be mentioned 
on this issue was the Tanzimats during the year 1839. According to its all the citizens 
without distinction as to religion and nationality were to be treated equals and were to 
enjoy the right to life, right to property and religion. Although the principles of the
F. Rexhepi, Kosova/o During history. pp.22-23.
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Ottoman reforms were often heavily diluted by the time therr effects reached Kosova/o, 
these decades do show a steady growth in cultural and education of all communities 
living there. A new system of Turkish language in a state-run schools was introduced 
from 1830s onwards. By the mid of 1860, Prizren for example had seventeen elementary
schools. There were also medresess (Islamic seminaries) in the six Kosova/o towns. 32
Whilst to some nationalities the Sultanate recognized the right to education on then· 
mother tongue, this principle didn’t go for the Albanians, as they were supposed to be 
identified with the nationality and religion. According to this principle, the Muslim 
Albanians were called Turks, the orthodox Albanians-Slaves and the Catholics 
Albanians-Romans. As they were not given the right to be educated in their mother 
t a n g u e . The best result years, probably, were the 1860s and early 1870s.By then 
Kosova/o itself was fairly peaceful. By the mid 1860s there were already telegraph lines 
connecting Prizren, Peja and Prishtina with the Solonica and Istanbul. '^^
By the new administrative reform undertaken in the year 1864, instead of elayets there 
were created the vilayets. By this reform the civil administration was separated from the 
military one. The Albanian land by this reform included four villayets: Kosova Villayet, 
Shkodra, Manastir and Janina. This administrative division remained into force until the 
end of the Ottoman Empire. In the year 1867 was established the Villayet of Kosova 
based in Prizren, which later on changed the place, and was placed in Prishtina and later
Jashar Rexhepagiqi, Zhvillimi I Kosoves. Prishtine, 1978.pp.l 14-117. ( In English; Dvelopment of 
Kosova/o. Prishtina, 1978.pp.l 14-117.)
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N. Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, pp. 190-192.
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on in Shkup. The Kosova/o Villayet included the territory of ancient Dardania. This 
villayet stretched from Pirot and Kumanova in the east up to Gucia and Plava on the west 
and Nish,Sienica and Pazar on the north up to Diber and Elbasan in south. The Kosova/o 
Villayet had an area of 22.900 km2, which means that it double compared the current 
one. The Kosova/o Villayet had the status of political administration within the scope of
the Ottoman Empire. 35
Since the first middle of the XIX century, the neighboring countries such as Serbia, 
Montenegro and the Greece had openly expressed their territorial aspiration on the 
fragmentation of the Albanian land. Due to this, Serbia and Greece drafted plans and 
special political programs, known as the Nacertania (The outline), prepared by the prime 
minister Ilia Garshanin and the Greek Megali Idea in 1844.’’The Outline”was a blueprint 
for a Greater Serbia.^  ^ It was envisaged by this Project to include all the Albanian lands 
up to Shkumbin including Kosova/o. The Nacertania is a crucial in understanding the 
development of the Serbian national idea. It is a document that comprises the centuries 
old dream preserved by the church and epic poetry and formulates them into a statement 
of modern nationalism.^^
These expansionist aims of the neighboring countries, Serbia's in the first place, became 
a reality in 1887 after Russia had declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The latter one 
was defeated. On the Russian side, there were already Serbia and Montenegro after
35 F. Rexhepi, Kosova/o During History, p.23.
“  T. Judah, The Serbs, p.56. 
T. Judah, The Serbs, p.59.
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having the aspirations openly supported by the Russia. This was confirmed by the Treaty 
San Stefano on March 3,1887. It was dictated to the defeated Turkey. The Treaty 
favored Russia and the Slav states in the Balkans. By this Treaty the Albanian land 
was fragmentized badly. Yet, many aspects of this Treaty were unacceptable to other 
Great Powers of the time so that a Congress was called in Berlin to revise it.^ *
In July 1878 a Treaty of Berlin was the one to determine the shape of the Ottoman 
possessions in the Western Balkans until the final destruction of the of the Ottoman 
Empire.Serbia was allowed to keep the whole Nish area but no territory of Kosova itself. 
Some territory was given to Montenegro, including the Gusinje area (to the north of the 
modern Albanian border), which had been a part of the Vilayet of Kosova/o.
Following the Serb-Turkish war (1876-1878), the Serbian regime, aspiring to create an 
ethnically pure Serbian state, forcefully drove out the indigenous Albanians from over 
700 villages of the districts of Prokuple, Kurshumlija, Vranje, Leskoc, Nish, Pirot, Bela 
Palanka, present day Serbia.^^ Ever since the Albanian people is faced by the 
fragmentation issue of the ethnic territories.
The Albanians reacted fiercely against the fragmentation of the ethnic territories. Due to 
this was held the Prizren League on June 10,1878 in which participated more then 300 
delegates from all the Albanian territories should be defended. The Assembly took the 
decision that by all means to defend the Albanian territories from further fragmentation
N. Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History. p.201.
39 Hivzi Islami, Demogrphic Reality In Kosova. Kosova Information Center (ed).Prishtina, 1998. p .l5 .
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by the neighboring countries and approved in silence by the Greater Powers. The League 
within its program had the creation of an autonomy under the auspices of the Ottoman 
Empire. The neighboring countries and Great Powers voiced their suspicion on the 
Prizren League, by calling it the tool of the Empire which intends to keep the integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the Prizren League had the conservative Muslim 
participants, but it had also the nationalists whose aspiration was the Greater Albania.'*®
In 1878 the Prizren League was established, having all the statehood features and the 
political program for the unification of all Albanian territories in an Albanian state under 
the sovereignty of the Empire, no doubt having the objective the independent state as it 
was the case with other Balkan states.'** No doubt that the Prizren League is for the 
Albanian people the founding stone of its National Renaissance The Prizren League had 
its own organs in charge for the war and made a huge resistance during the years 1878- 
1881-until it was put down by force. The Prizren League , deafeted by force through, was 
a turning point for the generations to come and brought the Albanian issue to the
attention of the Great Powers.42
The European events gave to it a political dimension. The Eastern crisis of the years 
1875-1877 and the Berlin Treaty (1878) placed the Albanians in a pinch situation. 
Furthermore, it brought the Albanian patriots into a dilemma whether to commit 
themselves against the Ottoman Empire alongside with other Christian people who
George Castellan, Historia e Ballkanit. Shtepia Botuese "Besa". Tirane, 1997. ( In English: The History 
of the Balkans. Publishing House "Besa". Tirana, 1997. p.381.
Xhafer Bekegu, Lidhia e Prizrenit dhe ndikimi I sai. 1878-1881. Tirane, 1939.p.l 1. (In 
English: Xhafer Belegu, The Prizren League and its impact, 1878-1881. Tirana, 1939.p. 11)
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denied their existence or to line up after the Sultan, who was ready to reward the 
Albanians by recognizing their- nationality. The Albanian movement had some second 
thoughts which were used by the hostile powers, who wanted to refer to the existence of 
the Muslim majority only to qualify the Albanians as natural allies of the T urks.A fter 
the distinguished Prizren League, the hot spot for future uprisings remained, time and 
again Kosova/o. Two important uprisings took place during the years 1884-1885 and 
1892-1893. The Assembly of Peja took place from 23 to 29 Januai-y, 1899. This 
organization was named as the League of Peja, which followed the paths of the Prizren 
League.
In these times important changes were under way in the Ottoman Empire. The Jeune 
Turk Revolution of 1908 found Kosova/o ready to take part actively, .\fter seizing the 
power, the Jeune Turks undertook fierce measures against the national movement of the 
Albanians. They intervened by force during the parliamentary elections, halted the 
Albanian schools, and the Albanians were overburden by state taxes, which made them 
unhappy and in 1909 they upraised against the Jeune Turks. There were many uprisings 
in the years to come, in 1910,1911 and in the spring of 1912 was a pan Albanian 
uprising.
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire on July 17,1912, the new Government headed by 
Ahmet Myftar Pasha entered with the negotiations with the Albanians. Thus, being 
exhausted by incessant uprisings and unresolved national issue, the Albanian people in
G. Castellan, The History of the Balkans, p.382. 
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the years to come were to face unprecedented challenges ever in the Balkan wars of 1912 
and later on.
3. Kosova/o after the Balkan wars
The discussions held between Belgrade and Sofia ended on March of 1912 with a 
military alliance in the case of the attack by the third country, which maybe Austro- 
Hungary or Turkey. By this Treaty they envisaged the division of the Albanian 
territories. Similar treaties, but without any territorial aspiration, were signed between 
Athens and Sofia, Montenegro and Serbia and Bulgaria. The war broke out in November 
of 1912 where the above mentioned countries declare war to Turkey. In the meantime the 
armies of the Balkan states fought between each other and Tn the Albanian territories 
were general national uprisings. The Albanians had to struggle against both repression by 
the Turks and encroachments by their neighbors.'*^
The military activities of the First Balkan Wars complicated even more the situation, 
because attacks against the Turks were mostly in the territories dwelled by the Albanians. 
The advance by the Serbian Third Army into Kosova/o began before Serbia’s declaration 
of war on October 16,1912. The Serbs fought their way through, destroying the Albanian 
villages as they passed and reached Prishtina, which was taken by them on October 22. 
The objectives of Serbia can be seen by the Declaration given by the Prime Minister
45 Alush Gashi, The Denial...p.24.
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Pasic to the Times in November. ”It is essential that Serbia should possess about fifty 
kilometers from Allezio ( Lezha ) to Durazzo (Dürres) to Albania. In other words Serbia
would expand from Kosova/o through most of the northern Albania”.46
On the crossroad of the Balkan wars, half of the Albanian nation and more than half of its 
tenitory was found outside the Albanian state, that is, they were found under the 
occupation by the neighboring Balkan states, mainly Serbia."*’
During the successful expansion in Kosova, Macedonia and Sangjak, the 1844 program 
of the Serbian Minister of Interior, Ilia Grashanin that designed expansionist long-term 
goals for Serbian state, could finally be realized."** At the meantime the Independence of 
Albanian was declared on November 28,1912 in Vlora, where 83 delegates from all 
Albanian territories took part. Ismail Qemal Vlora was to nominate the Provisional 
Government and hereby inform the Great Powers and Turkey on the birth of the new 
state. The European Powers remained deaf on the decision taken in Vlora. Only later the 
Great Powers had to gather in London and were not in position to avoid completely the 
Albanian issue.
The Conference of Ambassadors in London headed by the British Foreign Minster Sir 
Edward Grey was divided between the Austro-Hungarian and Italy, which favored 
Albania, and France and Russia on the other side, which supported Serbia’s aspirations.
N. Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p.255.
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In the London Conference the Austro-Hungary argued that all the Albanian inhabited 
land should be included in it, but the idea was opposed by France and, most strongly, by 
Serbia’s protector power-Russia.'‘^  After many analysis and difficulties on July 
29,1913,they decided in favor of the establishment of the Sovereign principality of 
Albania a neutral state and under the auspices of the Great Powers.
The London Treaty rewarded Serbia with Kosova/o, Montenegro with Peja, Gjakova and 
Greece with Janina and Ephus. Thus, the newly created Albanian state was fragmented 
and the Conference justified the neighboring occupations of the Albanian lands so that 
large Albanian population remained beyond the borders of the independent Albanian 
state proclaimed on November 28,1918. On the basis of the Ottoman statistics, this 
population amounted to about 1.200.000 over an area of 48.000 square kilo meters,or two 
thirds of the Albanian-inhabited territories.
The Chairman of the Conference, Sir Grey, regarding the borders of Albania in the 
Lower House noted that: ’Tm quite aware that when everything will be known, this 
given solution will be a trigger for many critics from everyone who knows the country 
and judges the situation from the local point of view. One thing should not be forgotten 
that during the attempt made to find a solution, it was an aim to keep the agreement 
reached between the Great Powers and the peace in Europe”.^ * Thus the injustice done
N. Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p.256.
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against the Albanian people once again justified the sacrifice on the name of the peace in 
Europe. But that did not matter very much since a year later the First World War broke
out.
On the decisions taken in the London Conference, which was the outcome of the Balkan 
wars, the author Castellan writtes: ‘This unfortunate people (Albanian) are left time and 
again at the mercy of anarchy and intervention of foreign foes”. '^ At the time, the 
Albanian territory was divided into almost two equal parts, a fact also confirmed by 
Dimitrije Tucovic when he wrote on the Albanians as neighbours: ’’Half of its
population has remained in the borders of our new state”.
The Albanians were severly hit by theii· territorial fragmentation, which has been 
recognized by many authors and the Serbs themselves. On this issue the well known 
academician Vladimir Dedier wrote:” As its seems to be the case, there is not any 
country in the world, which has suffered more as a result of an aftermath of the bargains 
in the London Conference as it is the case with the Albanians”.^ '*
The Balkans Wars were to set the precedent in this century for massive waves of ethnic 
cleansing and the forced migration of people.^^
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The occupation of Kosova/o by Serbia was always done by force and against the will of 
Kosovars Albanians. Some Serb authors acknowledge the fact the annexation of Kosova 
from Serbia and Montenegro in 1913,was perpetrated against the Albanian aspfration
expressed in their national liberation movements during the years 1878-1912.56
In fact the Balkan Wars were very harmful for all the Balkan states. They were divided 
where everybody blamed everybody for notorious acts of violence and hatred, which 
continued up to the Second World War and beyond.
4. Kosova and the Albanians in the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (Later 
Yugoslavia)
The new Yugoslav state was proclaimed on 1*‘ of December 1918. Officially it was 
called: Serbo-Croat - Slovene Kingdom and brought together Serbia Kingdom, the 
Kingdom of Montenegro and several parts of Autro-Hungary, including Slovenia and the 
Creation territories. Serbia was the dominant element, not only because of its size and its 
victorious army, but also because the ruler was Serbia, the Prince Alexander
Ki'adordjevic.58
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The creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 had been an act of solution of the national question 
of the South Slaves, with exemption of the Bulgars.^^ Regarding Serbia’s national aim, 
creation of the Serbian-Croation-Slovene Kingdom, later renamed Yugoslavia, 
represented almost a total realization of their national program, and, towards the others, it 
opened the issue of Serbian hegemony as a result of a complete control of its state
structures.60
During the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, the territory of Kosova/o remained an 
administrative part of the state without any specific legal status, ie.the Albanians were 
not recognized even as a national minority.^' The Serb author Radojevic states: ”In the 
case of the occupation of Kosova in 1918, the Albanians were within the scope of the 
Serb State, namely Yugoslav one. Its that its creation in 1918 represented the very 
denial of the existence of the Albanian national question.^^ These allegations, though, do 
not reflect the reality.
Kosova/o had never been legally incorporated into the Serbian State. When Kosova/o 
was conquered in 1911-1913 Serbia was operating under its constitution of 1903.Article 
4 of that Constitution clearly states that no change of frontiers of Serbia can be valid
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unless it has been agreed by the Grand National Assembly. No such Grand National 
Assembly was ever convened to discuss or ratify the extension of Serbia’s borders to 
include Kosova/o. But the strange truth is that Kosova/o was not legally incorporated 
into Serbia by the standards of the international law either. '^* From the Albanian point of 
view this time is similar to that many other peoples conquered and colonized.
Under the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities, which is signed reluctantly in 1919, 
Yugoslavia promised to supply primary education in the local language in all ai'eas where 
a considerable proportion of the population had a language other than the official one 
(Serbo-Croatian). By 1930 there were no Albanian language schools or any other 
publication in Albanian language. As regard to the Albanian reaction on this issue and 
that of the international community on the violation of the minority rights the response 
was the following: the Serbs argued that non-recognition of the Albanian problem lies on 
the fact that the territories annexed after the Balkan Wars cannot be part of the minority 
protection as foreseen after the First World War.®^
The suppressing of their language and the denial of their existence as a national minority 
were not the only forms of pressure on the Albanians of Kosova/o. Kosova after the Serb 
occupation in 1912 was a place of inhuman treatement, that is, the Albanian Kosovars
were thoreatened to be exterminated.66
David Owen, Balkan Odyssey. Copyright © David Owen, 1995.pp.5-31.
N. Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, pp.264-265.
M. Almond, Europe’s Backyard War.pp. 115-118.
Zejnullah Gruda, E dreita e pupuive per vetevendosie. “E drejta”. No.2. Prill-Qershor, 1996. 
Prishtine.p. 14. ( In English; Zejnullah Gruda, The right of the people for self- 
determination. “The Law”. No. 2. April-June, 1996. Prishtina.p.14.)
28
A marked feature of this period is the large-scale program of colonization, settling Slav 
speaking people in the Albanian inhabited areas. The official policy of the Serbian 
Kingdom had been to exclude the Kosova/o Albanians and other Muslims from Kosova 
and Macedonia.^’. The Serbian regime passed special laws to stimulate the colonization 
of Kosova. Such a program was prepared by Dr.Vasa Cublilovic theSerb intellectual on 
March 7, 1937 in Belgrade. He presented to the Royal Government of Stojadinovic his 
Memorandum named as the “Expulsion of the Arnauts”.^  ^ His interest on Kosova was 
how to secure the land for the Serbs forever. In 1937, he declared that the only way to 
cope with the majority of Albanian population was to ’’use the brute force of an 
organized state violence.Based on this, in the interwar period, the Serbian dominated 
Government had driven out a large number of Albanians from Kosova/o and turned their 
land over to Serbian and Montenegrin colonists.^®
The colonization program was a complex phenomenon, serving a variety of aims. Its 
long term purpose was to change the national composition of the population of Kosova/o. 
Between the two War's over 11.000 Serb families with some 54.000 members and 
120.000 individuals were settled in Kosova/o. Most of them were settled in the areas 
bordering Albania. It is estimated that around 250.000 Albanians were forcefully 
expelled to Turkey and some other 50000 to Albania.^* The colonist enjoyed wide rang
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of advantages and incentives. This situation bears resemblance with the 1990s when the 
renewed program of colonization took place. First attempts were made in the Summer of 
1991, when the laws were passed giving the Serbs and Montenegrins who returned to 
Kosova the right to 5 hectares of land holdings. Due to the high-density rate and the high 
bii’th rate of the Albanains, the Serb programs for colonization failed time and again 
despite huge investments and unprecedented violence for this supreme goal of the 
Serbian regimes ever since their occupation in 1912 and which has continued incessantly 
until recently.
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CHAPTER III: THE PLACE OF K 0S0V A \0 WITHIN TITOITE
(COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA
1, Kosova\o issue during and immediately after World War Two
In April 1941 Yugoslavia was conquered by the German, Italian and Bulgaidan militaries. 
Most of Kosova\o had in fact been conquered by the German troops, but at a meeting of 
the Itahan and German foreign ministers in Vienna on 21 April 1941 it was agreed that the 
largest part of this Albanian inhabited territory should be under Itahan control and join to 
Albanian in order to prevent Albanian ethnic irredentism from becoming the driving force 
of an anti German resistance movement. ' Other part had remained under German 
occupation and small part under Bulgarians.
The Albanians who were reunited with Albania won some national rights, such as the 
right to schools, national flag etc. For Albanians it was a Uberation from the brutal 
regime of the Serbo-Croate-Slovene Kingdom. The attempt to unite or reunite Kosova\o 
with Albania was made in earnest. The decrees of the Itahan occupied Kosova\o, 
considered the Kosovars as the Albanian citizens. During the Second World War the 
Kosova\o region was attached to Itahan dominated Albania-a solution welcomed by most
' N. Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p.292.
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Albanians.^ At the end of September 1943, the Germans officially recognized Albania as
an independent state within the borders established by Mussolini.• 4
The Communist Party in Kosova\o was in fact just a small offshoot of an overwhelmingly 
Slav organization and was regarded there mainly as a Slav entity. By the Summer of 1940 
there were just 239 party members in Kosova\o, and of those only twenty-five were 
Albanians. By the time the War broke out following year the total had risen to 270,but 
the member of Albanians had dropped to twenty. In Western Kosova\o the members of 
the Party consisted mainly of colonists.^
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia has played off the politics of hatered against the 
Albanians and promised them that if they were involved in the War the right for self- 
determination up to secession would be granted on their behalf.  ^ The Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia had two main strategies when it came to the Albanians of Kosova\o . On the 
one hand they made some slight policy concessions towards Albanian nationalism, and on 
the other they ruthlessly suppressed the development of any non-Communist Albanian 
national resistance movement. The concessions were small but potentially significant.
The slogan of "self-determination” was allowed to creep into some of thee official 
statements of the Albanian Communist Party in relation to KosovaVo. In this line also
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went the statement of Tito and the AVNOJ ( which was de facto the interim government 
during the war), given on 4 December 1943,when he said: "The future of Kosova/o will 
be decided by plebiscite and borders, if is needed, will be regulated to the benefit of 
Albania”/  In aU documents of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia the Albanian people 
were considered as a nation. In these documents always noted of the Albanians as the: 
’Albanian nation’, 'people of Kosova/o’ and similaiiy.*
This was, apparently, a tactical ploy’ to counter the propaganda of the Second League of 
Prizren run by the Albanian nationalsts. Albanian nationalist have had a different stance 
from the Communists about the issue of Kosova/o. Thus the League of Prizren, the most 
organized and massive organization of the Albanian nationalists, gave a priority to the 
right solution for Kosova/o.Albanians of Kosova\o and other areas of the former 
Yugoslavia responded to the call to join the armed struggle against fascism, in the hope 
that they would in this way realize their- right to self-determination and national 
unification.“ In September 1942 the first all-Albanian partisan group was formed, called 
the ‘Zejnel Hajdini' brigade.
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During the Second World War the ntost important event was the Second Meeting of 
AVNOJ held in Jajce, on 29 November 1943.In this meeting it was decided a very 
important issue for the people of Yugoslavia, but the Albanian delegates had not been 
invited.'· The delegates from Kosova/o were not invited because the leadership of 
Yugoslavia at that time decided that issue of Kosova/o would be solved after the War 
depending on the political circumstances. On the other side, Albanians from Kosova/o, 
that is, their leadership held the Conference of' National Council of Albanians for 
Kosova/o and the Plain of Dukagjini. The Conference was held in Bujan-Gjakova, on 31 
December, 1943 and 1 to 2.January 1944. In the Conference there were invited 61 
delegates, present were 49 delegates from aU parts of Kosova/o (42 Albanian,6 Serbian 
and Montenegrins and one Muslim).
The Conference's most important document was the Resolution, that stated the following: 
'Kosova/o and the Plain of Dukagjin represent a territory largely inhabited by the Albanian 
people, who still today, as always, wish to unite with Albania. We therefor consider it our 
duty to show the correct path the Albanian people must foUow in order to realize their 
aspirations. The Albanians too, will be able to decide their destiny based on the right to 
self-determination up to secession”.'''
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development of the autonomy of Kosova/o. Prishtina, 1986.p. 18.)
F. Rexhepi, Kosova...p .34. Kurtesh Saliu, The birth...p. 19.
Fehmi Rexhepi: The struggle...p. 105.
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The decisions of the Conference of Bujan were welcomed in Kosova/o and other 
Albanian territories. Yugoslav leadership didn’t recognize the decisions of the Conference, 
because they run against their expansionist aim. Some Albanians remarked this . One 
Albanian partisan commander, Shaban PoUuzha, rejected an order to take his men to the 
front in Srem(the Croatian region),saying that he wanted to stay and defend his home 
region of Drenica against attacks on Albanians by Chetnik bands ( Serb paramilitaries ). 
His fighting in the Drenica region lasted until the Spring of 1945. During that time 44 
villages with around 20.000 people were supressed and destroyed by force. In the Second 
World War there were killed or exocuted by Communists around 28.400 people of 
Kosova/o, mostly Albanians.'·^
When in 1944 it was discovered that Kosova/o was again to be part of Yugoslavia, 
insurrections began and Tito was forced to send some 30.000 troops to pacify the 
region. At the end of War there had apparently rejected Albanian national aims. One of 
Tito's closest advisers, Edvard Kardelj, added one interesting qualification when 
supporting the idea that Kosova/o should remain under Serbia. He said: "The best 
solution, would be if Kosova/o were to be united with Albania, but because neither 
foreign nor domestic factors favor this, it must remain a compact province within the 
framework of Serbia”.
15 N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History. p.3I2.
Tim Judah, The Serbs, p. 132. 
K.Saliu. Lindia...p.30.
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On 8 February 1945 the military administration was introducted in Kosova/o. This was 
one of the ways to pressure the Drenica region to accept the annexations. On the other 
hand, there were played some political games such was the meeting of National Council of 
Serbia, held on 7 April 1945, when it decided that Kosova/o must joined Serbia.’*
Under such conditions of War, and military administration, from 8 to 10 July 1945, the 
leadership of Yugoslavia, in cooperation with Kosova/o’s leadership, which have been 
composed mostly by the Serbians and Montenegrins, organized in Prizren the Conference 
of National Council of Kosova/o and Dukagjini. From among 142 delegates, the majority 
were Serbian and Montenegrin. The Conference decided that Kosova/o should join 
“Federal Serbia”. This decision later served as a basis for constitutional dogmatic exercise 
of the ‘free will’, that is of the self-determination of Kosovar Albanians and hence as an 
act of unification with the Yugoslav Federation.’’
K. Saliu .Lindia... D.31.
‘’Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia. Copyright © Verso. 1993. p.34. Hannes Trettes-Joseph 
Marko-Tomoslav Boric. Perspectives.... pp.218-219. Fehmi Rexhepi, Kosova...p.35.
38
We can conclude that Second World War didn’t realize the aspkations of Albanian people 
for liberation unification. They have been liberated from the German occuoing forces but 
never allowed to decide for their future. The main difference in Kosovar Albanians 
position as compared the prewar Yugoslavia was that this time their official status had 
been recognized by the 1946 Constitution, although the policy of mass expulsion and 
repression continued unabated until 1 9 6 6 . In such an atmosphere of hostihty and 
suspicion it is not surprising that the thoughts of many Kosova/o Albanians turned once
again to emigration. 21
Economic integration of Kosova into former Yugoslavia and its development and 
prosperity, it was believed, would be enough, together with other Titoist postulates of 
Socialism to satisfy the Albanian national aspirations.This proved to be only 
assumption.
J.Gaw, Legitimacy of the military, pp.66-67.
See more; N.Malcolm, Kosovo...p.322.
"  J.F.Brown, Nationalism. Demacracv and Security in the Balkans. Copyright © by RAND 1992. 
pp.6163.
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2. Legal and political status of Kosova/o up to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia
Constitutionally, Socialist Yugoslavia was a state composed of six socialist republics and 
two socialist autonomous provinces. Each of these units had its own specific historical, 
religious and/or linguistic tradition.'^ Kosova/o which was granted a restricted level of 
autonomy within Serbia, had a considerably lower status than Vojvodinas. Tito never 
granted a full republican status for Kosova\o since it was contrai'y to the very idea, 
definition and the practice of a nation-state building, as it applied in all former Communist 
contries. Tito himself preferred a very careful and gradual improvements in Kosova\o so 
that by the end of 1970s,the controlled autonomy of KosovaVo had been widened 
significantly.
The definition of Kosova/o as an autonomous province and its denying of the republican 
status was based on the Communist theory and practice. The republican status 
understood the right for self-determination up to secession, which right was recognized 
only for nations. This practice existed in former Communist counturies and served as a 
basis for arbitrary decision on who is a nation and who is not."^
Vesna Godina.The outbreak of nationalism on former Yugoslavia. A Historical problem of 
supranational identity. “ Nations and Nationalism”.Vol. 4 Part 3. July 1998. p.410.
Mehmet Kraja, Vitet e humbura. Tirane, 1995. p.61. ( In English: Mehmet Kraja, Lost years. Tirana, 
1995.p.61.)
Michael Krykov, Self-determination from Marx to Mao. “Ethnic and Racial Studies”. Vol. 19 No.2 
April, 1996. Pp.352-377.
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A turning point in the status and role of the Albanians in Yugoslavia came in 1966 with 
the fall of Aleksandar Rankovic,a leading proponent of Serb-centralism, the Vice-
President of Yugoslavia and neir apparent to Tito. The limited measures of liberalization 
following Rankovic's dismissal were used by Kosova/o's Albanians to press for greater 
autonomy.·*  ^It is impossible to underestimate the effect of the faU of Rankovic.lt marked a 
definitive point in Yugoslav history and the beginning of a period of hberahzation 
previously unimaginable in a Communist country. Although Kosova\o was ostensibly 
autonomous, this was largely theoretical until the fall of Rankovic. The fall of Rankovic 
was to bring about a rapid change of atmosphere."’ Rankovic's fall in July 1966 essentially 
ended the crisis.
On 27 November 1968,there were exploded the first demonstrations of Albanians after the 
Second World War. The main claim of demonstrators had been for the advancing of the 
status of Kosova/o from province to republic.
Miranda Vickers, The role of Kosova in post-war Yueoslav-Albanian relations. The Kosova/o issue 
historical and current problem. Tirana, 1996.p.l27.
27 Tim Judah, The Serbs, p. 144-151.
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These demonstrations discovered the uni'esolved problem of the Albanians under 
Yugoslav regime which had been avoided for a long time by this regime.'® The result of 
these demostrations were the opening of the University of Prishtina( 1970),and the 
constitutional amendments( 1968.197 l)etc. Constitutional amendments in 1968 and 1971 
granted the region of Kosova\o some republican prerogatives. This was con&med in the 
Constitution of 1974. Positive trends in Kosova\o, for the fu'st time, were obvious. The 
constitutional basis of Kosova\o was strengthened and completed, the University of 
Prishtina was formed, and a number of state institutions had been cut off from the 
Belgrade regime and put under direct control of the political and administrative power of
Prishtina. 29
The ilrst penetration of the constitutional individuality of Albanian people in Yugoslavia 
were noted by the constitutional amendments of 1968.®° The general direction of political 
developments in Yugoslavia from 1960s through 1980s was toward even greater 
decentralization.
2.1. The Constitutional legal position of Kosova\o according to the Constitution of 
1974
28 Fehmi Rexhepi, Kosova...p .37. 
Mehmet Kraja, Vitet...p.74.
G. Zajmi, Vepra...p .l 14.
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The constitutional and legal position of Kosova\o according to the Constitution of former 
Yugoslavia of 1974,was in many spheres similar (but not completely equal) to the position 
of the socialist republics. Kosova/o was more then province and less then republic. The 
legal status of Kosova/o was composed by two main factors, which have determined the 
position of Kosova/o under Yugoslav federation
2.1.1. The Status of Kosova/o as a political-territorial unit.
In constitutional and legal sphere Kosova/o enjoyed the high independence like the other 
republics of the Yugoslav federation. Kosova/o had its own Constitution approved on 27 
February 1974. Through it, Kosova/o could decide for its own political system and the 
relations with the Yugoslav federation and the Republic of Serbia. Kosova\o was an equal 
partner with other federal units in the procedure of passing and changing of the federal 
Constitution, including the right to veto. This means that the Constitution of SFRY of 
1974 could not be changed without the consent of the Parliament of Kosova\o.^‘ The 
consent of the Parliament of Kosova\o presented a constitutive act in the procedure of the 
change of the Constitution of Serbia of 1974 as well. The status of Kosova/o as an 
independent unit of the Federation was expressed in other areas as well.
-Independence in the sphere of organization
32
See more: The Constitution of SFRY of 1974 article 401. 
See more; The Constitution of SFRY. art.227.
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The Constitution of Kosova\o of 1974,as the highest political-juridical act, defined the 
state organization of Kosova\o similar to that of the other federal units in the former 
Yugoslavia. On the basis of the Constitution of 1974,the main bodies of Kosova\o were: 
The Parliament of Kosova\o,the Presidency of Kosova\o, the Executive Council, the 
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the Public Prosecution, the National bank of 
Kosova/o etc.
-Territorial independence of Kosova\o
On the basis of the Constitution of the former SPRY of 1974,Koosva\o had its borders, 
which were defined as untouchable by the federal Constitution. Only the legal and
legitimate Parliament of Kosova was competent to change the borders of Kosova\o. .1.1
-Independence in the sphere of judiciary
The independence of- Kosova\o was fully expressed in this sphere. Judiciary, in all 
instances, from communal courts to the Supreme Court, was the competence of 
Kosova\o. The Supreme Court of Kosova\o presented the final instance of judiciary in 
which various issues, such as civilian, criminal, economic and administrative were solved 
before it. Except for courts, KosovaNo had also other independent bodies of judiciary, the 
Public Prosecution, Office Public Practice of Law etc."^ '’
”  Cons. SFRY art.5 and Cons. Of Kosova\o art.3).
Const.of .Kosova\o art. 301 point 3. art. 292, 300, 339, 372 and 390.
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-Independence in the financial and economic sphere
In the sphere of finance, Kosova\o had its own contributions and C/Xpenditures that were 
defined by its budget that was approved by the Parliament of Kosova\o. In the economic 
sphere as well, Kosova\o had abundant economic and natural resources that had been 
used and exploited by Serbia and Yugoslavia, cousign in this way great backwardness in 
the economic development of Kosova\o as compai'ed to other regions of the former
Yugoslavia. 35
-Independence in the sphere of protection of constitutionally and legislation
It was expressed in the function of the Constitutional Court of Kosova\o, as an 
independent body for protection of constitutionality and legality. Constitutional legislature 
in Kosova\o appeared for the first time by the Constitution of 1974. This body had similar 
position with that of constitutional courts of the other federal units. The Constitutional 
Court of Kosova\o ruled at one stage only as the final court, so that its decisions were 
conclusive and definite.
-Independence in the sphere of international relations
35 Constitution of Kosova/o art. 301 point 4.
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In the sphere of international relations Kosova\o entered political, economic, cultural, and 
other relationships with other countries independently. The activity of Kosova\o in this 
field was limited in the some way as the activity of the other federal units, by authorization 
of the federal bodies.^*
-Independence in the sphere of keeping order and providing security and national 
defense
In these two spheres as well, Kosova/o enjoyed independence similar to that of other 
federal units of the former Yugoslavia. The bodies of Kosova\o were competent to 
practice all the functions of keeping the public and state order as defined by the 
Constitution of former Yugoslavia of 1974 and by the Constitution of Kosova\o of the 
same year. In the sphere of national and self-defense, the bodies of Kosova\o were 
competent for the organization of aU forms of defense. These duties were exercised by 
the independent bodies of Kosova\o: the Secretariat for National Defense, the 
Headquarters of Territorial defense and the Headquarters of Civilian defense.
2.2. Kosova\o was a Constituive Element of the Yugoslav Federation
Cons. Kosova\o.art.301 point 6).
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According to the constitution of the former Yugoslavia of 1974,Kosova was a constitutive 
element and unit of the Yugoslav Federation with similar rights and duties as other federal 
units. It had the following constitutional and legal position;
-Kosova\o was an integral part of the former Yugoslav Federation (Constitution of SFRY 
of 1974, art.l and 2).
-Kosova\o had its territory and borders, which could not be changed without its 
consent.(Cons. SFRY of 1974 art.5)
-Kosova\o had its Presidency as a body that represented Kosova\o into the bodies of 
administration in the former republics of Yugoslavia. (Cons. SFRY.art 150).
-Kosova\o had its administrative bodies with the same rights and duties as the bodies of 
administration in the former republics of Yugoslavia. (Cons.of SFRY.art.150).
-Kosova\o, as one of the eight federal units, took part in the realization of interests in the 
determining and implementation of the policy of the federation, (cons. SFRY art.244 
para.2 )
-The national Bank of Kosova\o was an institution of the unique monetary system that 
implemented the common policy of emission that was defined by the Parliament of the 
former Yugoslavia. (Cons. SFRY.art.260 paragraph 1).
-Kosova\o co-operated with other republics in the sphere of tax policy(Cons. SFRY 
art.265 para.l).
-Kosova\o took part in the implementation of cooperation with the bodies and 
organizations of other states and international organizations in the framework of foreign
3 7 Const.of Kosova/o. art. 301 point 2.
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policy defined by the former Yugoslavia and international treaties(Cons. SPRY.art 271 
par.2).
-Kosova\o with the other republics took pait in the implementation of laws and other 
provisions and general acts of the federationfCons.of SPRY.art.273 para. 1 and 2). 
-KosovaVo was represented into the chamber of Republics and Provinces of the Parliament 
of the former YugoslaviafCons.of SPRY.art.284 para.3).
-Kosova\o, its Parliament, gave its consent on certain questions in the sphere of the 
activity of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces.(Cons.of SPRY.art. 186 para.2). 
-Kosova\o was represented into the Pederal Charhber of the Parliament of the former 
Yugoslavia.(Cons.of SPRY.art.291 para. 1).
-Kosova/o, similar to the other former republics of Yugoslavia, had its right to propose 
laws and other acts during the work of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces.(Cons.of 
SPRY.art.298).
-Kosova\o was represented through its member at the Presidency of the former 
Yugoslavia.(Cons.of SPRY art.321).
-Kosova\o was represented at the Pederal Executive Council.(Cons.of SPRY art.348 
para. 1).
-Kosova\o was represented in the Constitutional Court of former Yugoslavia.(Cons.of 
SPRY.art.381 para.l).
-Kosova\o ,its Parliament and other bodies, had the right to initiate for the procedure of 
the evaluation of constitutionally and legitimacy before the Constitutional Court of the 
former Yugoslavia.(Cons.of SPRY.art.387 para.2).
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-Kosova\o was represented at the Federal Court of the former Yugoslavia.(Cons.of SFRY 
art.370 pra.2).
-Kosova\o had an equal position with former republics in the procedure of approving and 
changing the Constitution of the former Yugoslavia.(Cons.of SFRY ail. 198.399 and 402 
pai‘a.2).
From the above constitutional and legal analysis of the position of Kosova\o based on the 
Constitution of 1974,one can draw an undeniable conclusion that it was an independent 
federal unit with full political subjectivity and presented a constitutive element of the 
Yugoslav Federation. The status of Kosova/o according to the Constitution of 1974 has 
three main characteristics: First, political and constitutional independence; Second, the 
characteristic of constitutional unit of Yugoslav federation, and Thiixl. the characteristic of 
autonomy as a ‘corpus seperatum’ within the complex structure of the Republic of
Serbia. 38
If Croatian nationalism and its political consequences represented aU the time the principal 
threat to the integrity and stability of former Yugoslavia, by the 1970s Kosova/o had 
become the loci of new ethnocentric malaise and a new serious actor in the power balance 
of the than federative Yugoslavia.^^
.18 G. Zajmi, Vepra...pp. 78-79.
•^^Sabrina.P.Ramet. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962-1971. Copyright © 1984, 1992 by 
S.P.Ramet. p.l76.
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With this improvement in the status of Kosova/o, the Serbian nationahsts have not been 
satisfited. In 1976 they wrote the ‘Blue Book’ with which they attempted to reduce the 
status of Kosova/o. From 1974, the Serbs have used “chosen trauma” to refer to an event 
that invokes in the members of one group intense feehngs of having been humiliated and 
victimized by members of another group, Albanians. A Serbs does not, of course ‘chose’ 
to be victiiTiized and, subsequently, to lose self-esteem, but it does ‘chose’ to psychologize 
and mythohgize.‘’*
With this status have not been fully satisfied Albanians as well. The demand of the 
Kosova/or Albanians for their own repubhc has roots in the awakening of a sense of 
intense national pride which until long ago was denied to them, though tolerated in other 
Yugoslav nationahties. The spring explosion of 1981 is in many ways a product of this 
delayed consummation of national equality and rights. Their size and ethnic compactness 
were, in the eyes of the Albanian population, sufficient reason for changing Kosova/o’s 
status from that of a province into the full republican one.‘*‘
Reaction of the Yugoslav regime led by the Serbians, has been very brutal. It was in 
Kosova/o that for the first time the police had used firearms against demostrations. In 
1981 a new round of violent rioting began and the army, commandos and special police 
units were deployed to put down the protests/^
Vamik D.Volkan and Norman Itzkovitz, Neighbours in Conflict. ©Vamik D.Volkan and Norman 
Itzkovitz,1994.p.7).
Branka Mgas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, p.9.
See more: T. Judah, The Serbs...p.153.
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After 1981 an extensive wave of imigration of Albanians occurred, mainly among the 
young people who left in an attempt to avoid persecution by the police and .military state. 
Both economic and political conditions deteriorated. It is estimated that around 1 million 
Albanians live today in Western Countries half of whom have emigrated in the past two
decades 43
In the final analysis, the political reaction to the crisis in Kosova/o did little to improve the 
situation and much to harm it. The Serbian political and cultural leadership used the 
Kosova/o riots of 1981 as an excuse for the revival of their centuries old national program 
that was drafted again in 1981 by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.“* .For 
realization of the aims of the 1986 Memorandum was chosen Milosevic who was deemed 
as the most apt person for this and, again, it started in Kosova/o at the end 1980s.·*'*
Than the regime of Belgrade, supported by the other republics, begun the abolishment of 
autonomy of Kosova/o. Also the leadership of Kosova/o at that time was an instrument of 
the Serbian regime. Despite discussions for the changes in Constitution, which were held 
in 4.300 meetings with more than 400.000 participants in them rejecting the changes.
■*’ H. Islami, Demoeraphic...p.21.
For the full text of the Memorandum of the SASA in Serbo-Croatian, see, ’Nasa terne’ 33 (1-2) Zagreb 
1989 pp.l28-163.For its essential parts in English, see, Fehmi Pushkolli-Liman Rushiti-Fehmi Rexhapi- 
Jusuf Bajraktari and Izber Hoti. (ed). Expulsion of Albanians and Colonization of Kosova/o. Copyright © 
1997 by the Institute of History of Kosova/o, Prishtina, pp.80-87
^■'Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia. Nationalism in a Multinatianal State. © by 
A.Pavkovic, 1997. pp.89-90.
51
under the unusual cii-cumstances, declared by the Federal Presidency, there were approved 
the constitutional changes that destroyed the political and economic subjectivity of 
Kosova/o. Under these conditions the constitutional amendments were passed, although 
without the two-thii'ds majority normally required for such changes. The final 
confirmation of these changes was than in an unusually festive Session of the Serbian 
Assembly in Belgrade on 28 March 1989.
The Serbs considered these changes as a ‘chosen glory’ refering to this event as 
something that induces in the members of the Serb nation intense feelings of having been 
successful or of having triumphed deservedly over the members of the Albanian nation. 
Chosen glories serve to bolster a group’s present self-esteem and, like chosen traumas, are 
heavily mythologized/’
The successful actions of the Belgrade regime against the Albanians of Kosova/o have 
been supported naively by other federal units. They didn’t understand that this was the 
way for Serbian hegemony over Yugoslavia. With these constitutional changes, broken 
the balance within Yugoslavia created by Constitution of 1974 was broken. After that 
Serbia achieved the domination over the federation, respectively federal institutions. 
Milan Kucan, the President of the Communist Party of Slovenia at that time, declared: 
"Yugoslavia defended in Kosova/o is over". In the following years, support of other 
federal units were revansh and boomerang for them and whole Yugoslavia.
A.Gashi, The Denial, pp.102-103. Fehmi Rexhepi. Kosova..p39. N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short history 
.p.344.
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Miloshevic is coming to power was a result of his claim against the Albanian rights for 
equal status within Yugoslavia. The abolishment of the Kosova/o’s autonomy and the 
destruction of former Yugoslavia were a result of his expansionist regime. His policy has 
made the tragedy of Yugoslavia and its people.
S.Desintegration of Yugoslavia with special reference to Kosova/o
The creation and dissolution of Yugoslavia came about as a consequence of major 
geopolitical changes.'*  ^ Yugoslavia was, however, a country created by the international 
community.·^  ^ After Tito’s death, the federal center started to decay at first slowly, but 
after 1987, rapidlyZ*’
Problematic relations between the nations were always present in former Yugoslavia. 
Because formal equality strategies for both nations (Serbs and Croats) were established, 
there were a constant drive for domination by each side in this officially multinational
■*’ Vamik D.Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, Neighbours in Conflict, p. 10.
^®Darko Sekulic, The Creation and Disollution of the Multinational State: the case of Yugoslavia. p.l69. 
■^ L^ord Owen, The break up of Yugoslavia: its international aspects. “International Peacekeeping” Vol.3 
No.2/3 February-May 1996.p.34.
Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962-19991. p.34.
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state. The Serbs were more successful in this game and the result was Serb domination ' 
‘the Serb hegomony'. Socialist Yugoslavia survived only as long as its succeeded in 
realizing such hegemony
The slogan ' brotherhood and unity ' on which Yugoslavia has been based was a sort 
of supranationality. This position was taken over by national identity during the post­
socialist stage. Later developments in former Yugoslavia can be considered as a result of 
connection between the outburst of nationalist conflict and the fall of supranational 
identity.^"
The outbreak of nationalism on the territory of the former Yugoslavia is a provocative 
phenomenon, not only because its political consequences (war),but also because it raised 
theoretical question which ai'e worth of a detailed analysis.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had entered into its final phase of dissolution 
by the mid of 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia enforced their declarations of independence 
( June 1991) and when the Yugoslav People Army intervened in order to preserve the 
territorial integrity of the country.*^
■^‘Vesna Godina,The outbreak of nationalism on former Yugoslavia. A historical problem of supranational 
identity. “Nations and Nationalism”. Vol.4 Part 3 July 1988 p.411-412.
See more: Vesna Godina, The outbreak...pp.409-420.
■'’^ Snezana Trifunovska, Preventive Peacekeeping and the case of FYROM. “International 
Peacekeeping”.Vol.4 No. 1-2 Januar-December 1997 p.2.
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The Albanian-Serb conflict is not the main factor for the dissolution of the multinational 
federation of Yugoslavia, but it was the initial factor of its dissolution.Kosova/o of 
25th April 1987 became the date of self-destruction of former Yugoslavia, a date when the 
formal execution of the war preparations began.'^ '"’ In Fushe Kosova/o, ( In Serbian: 
Kosovo Polje ) there was first promotion of this psychological preparation and was 
hysteria and, consequently, implementation of the dream of Greater Serbia. On this date
Milosevic made his famous promise to the Serbs by saying that; "No one has the right to 
beat You up". When Yugoslavia's dissolution started, it was clear that Serbia was in its 
way to implementing its National Program of the Greater Serbia (especially from 1989 
onwards),and its centralist tendencies became clearer than ever before.^’ Secretary of 
State Baker, speaking for the US, declared that ’’the apparent objective of the Serbian 
leadership is to create a ‘small Yugoslavia or a ‘Greater Serbia’...based on the kind of 
repression which Serbian authorities have exercised in Kosova/o for several years..
G. Zajmi, Vepra...p. 121.
Almont, Europe’s backyard war, p.9.
56Darko Hudelist, Kosova'o- Bitka bez iluziia ©Center za informisanje I publicitet.Zagreb.l989.pp.34-37.
( In English: Darko Hudelist, Kosova/o- Battle without illusion. Copyright © Center for information and 
publicity. Zagreb, 1989. pp.34-37.)
■'’^ See more: Jansuz Bugajski, Nations in Turmoil. Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Evrope. Copyright 
© 1993 by Westview Press inc.pp.125-136.
•“^ ^Rezolution 713 (1991), adopted by the Security Council at its 3009th Meeting, 25 September 1991. 
Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through documents, pp..349-350.
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Since the collapse of the old Yugoslavia, there have been attempts by all the parties 
involved to ensure rewriting of the history so as to place themselves in the best light and 
to defame their opponents.^** Personalities, as always, have played an important role and 
there have been many evil players thriving in the climate of Communism and in the 
absence of democracy.^“ By 1990, S.Milosevics had reduced Montenegro,Vojvodina and 
Kosova/o to a mere satellites of Serbia, and, accordingly, controlled four of the eight 
votes in the collective presidency. Milosevic's ability to produce deadlocks in the 
presidency at will was, however, only one symptom of the disintegration of the federal
system, 61
Serbia and its satellites in May 1991 blocked Stipe Mesic, who was to be the Croatian 
rotating president of the collective Presidency. This marks the end of institutional
destruction of the former Yugoslavia.62
In the constitutional sense, on the other hand, the unilateral changes to the status of 
KosoOva/o and Vojvodina mark the beginning of the process of Yugoslavia’s violent 
disintegration. It marked the beginning of the radical change in the balance of power 
between the federal units of the former Yugoslavia with an open hegemonic tendency on 
Serbia's side.
David E, Goodlett, History and Nationality among former Yugoslavs. “European Security”. Vol.6 No.2 
Summer 1997 p.53.
Lord Owen, The break-up...p.34.
S.P.Ramet, Nationalism...p .69
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From the beginning of the 1980s the Kosova/o, the Serbian movement used a wide range 
of racist arguments to fuel anti-Albanian sentiment.' '^* The Kosova/o myth has always been 
a critical part of the Serbian collective psyche. It represents a collection of historical, 
quasi-historical, and poetic reminiscences about the Serbian medieval state and uprisings 
against the Ottoman Empire. The myth is about struggle, and it is rehashed every time 
Serbia goes to war.'’'* The Serbs in Kosova/o have seen their history and in their present 
circumstances, heriosm, mission, holiness, faith, glory, devotion, opulence, disunity, 
betryal, demonization, martyrdom, victimization, predestination. '^”'
The final act of Serbia’s economic preparation for warfare occurred in December
1990,when Milosevic's regime, without the knowledge of the Central Bank, extorted 2 
billion dollars of the Yugoslav dinars hard-currency backing. Subsequently, aU the 
resources of Central bank of the former Yugoslavia (foreign currency, gold and 
valuables)were used for financing the war.**® When the fighting broke out in Croatia 
(September 1991) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (March-April, 1992), the military openly sided 
with the Serbs in their effort to create a Greater Serbia/’
Eduard R Ricciuti, War in Yugoslavia.The Breakup of a nation. Copyright © 1993 by Blackbrich 
Graphics ins.pp.26-27.
6 .“;
Tihomir Loza, Kosovo Albanians. Closing the Ranks.’’Transitions”. Vol.5 No.5 May ,1998. p.23. 
Tihomir Loza, Kosovo...p.23.
Warren Zimmerman, The Demons of Kosova/o. “The National Interests”. No.52 Spring 1998 p.3.
66 Almond, Europe’s bacvard war. p.I5. W.Zimmerman, Origins of a catastrophe. Yugoslavia and its 
destroyers. Americans Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Wy. Copyright © 1996 by W.Z. 
Albanian translation by "Besa" Publishing Huose. Tirana-Albania. 1997 p.92.
J.Gow, Legitimacy and the military. p.l42, Bebler, The Jugoslav Crisis, pp.6-7.
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The independence efforts by Slovenia and Croatia (March-June 1991), Macedonian and 
Kosova/o (September 1919) Bosnia-Herzegovina (Mai'ch-April 1992), all were undertaken 
as a result of Serbia's aggressive plans against the others in former Yugoslavia.The Croats 
and Slovenes wanted a loose federation that would dilute the Serbian influence, so did 
Bosnia and Macedonian, although their wishes were not so obvious at the time. The 
Serbians wanted a tighter federation to preserve its control of the pohtics and economy
and its dominant role over Yugoslav society. 68
The support for maintaining the territorial integrity of the Federation voiced by 
representatives of influential states and organizations, including the United States, the 
European Community (EC) and its members, and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), undoubtedly strengthened Slobodan Milosevic in his 
perception that flexibility was not required in negotiations, since independence for
Slovenia and Croatia was not being supported internationally.69
On 19 September 1992, the Security Council of the UN adopted a resolution No.777 in 
which it was said that ’’the state formerly known as the Socialist Federal Repubhc of 
Yugoslavia has ceased to exist” and that “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations”. At the same time it was
68 Bugajski, Nations in Turmoil, pp. 101-109. Bebler.The Yugoslav crisis p.5.
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recommended to the FRY to applying for membership in the UN. Also, Intentional 
Monetary Found announced on 15 December 1992, that Yugoslavia has ceased to exist 
and has therefore ceased to be a member of the IMF”. Also executive directors of the 
World bank made a determination that Yugoslavia had ceased to exist/® Also thii‘teen 
opinions of Badinter Commission concluded that with the dissolution, which started in 
November 1991 and ended in July 1992, the former SFRY ceased to exist as an 
international legal subject.
All the worst evils that were witnessed in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 
were present in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, including large-scale massacres of civilians.
the destruction of whole towns and the gross manipulation of the media. 72
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the broken relations between the Slav people, 
there was no reason for Albanians from Kosova/o to stay under the newly created State of 
Serbia and Montenegro ( the FRY ). Albanians had no reason to be grateful for 
Belgrade’s rule.’  ^ Interethnic tensions remained high in Kosova/o over the years, and 
distrust between the Slavs and the Albanians, at the time, ran deep. Albanian people has 
no reason to be glad with the manner they were treated by the Slavs, the Serbs especially, 
during the regime of former Yugoslavia..
69
70
Alan Fogelquist, Handbook of Facts on the Break-up of Yugoslavia: International Policy and the War 
in Bosni-Herzegovina. ©Copyright 1993 by A.Foglequist. pp.12-13.
^IMF Press release No. 92/92 December 23, 1992. Quoted in Malcolm N.Shaw, State succession 
Revisited. ’’The Finish yearbook of International Law”. Vol.5 1994. p.53.
See more about the Badinter opinions in Trifonovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents.
Tim Judah, The Serbs. . .p.84.
Sabrina P.Ramet, Nationalism...p.34.
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CHAPTER IV: THE EVENTS IN KOSOVA/0 LEADING TO ITS FORMAL 
INDEPENDENCE FROM SERBIA ANF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
1.Formal acts of the Kosova/o’s organs
1.1. The Constitutional Declaration ( 2 July 1990 )
The decomposition of SFRY and the creation of the new circumstances within the teritory 
space of the former Yugoslavia was the most convenient political moment for the 
articulation and realisation of historic and legitimate aspkations of Kosova/o Albanians.
On 2 July, 1990, on the plateau of the building of the Kosova/o Parliament,! 11 delegates 
of the Parliament of Kosova/o approved and publicly proclaimed the Constitutional 
Declaration on Kosova as an Independent and Equal unit within the Yugoslav federation 
or Confederation.*
With the Constitutional Declaration, the will of majority population was considered and 
have achieve the high level under Yugoslavia. The Republic of Kosova/o first of all 
realized the historic intentions and aspirations of Albanian population for freedom and
‘ Constitutional Declaration of Kosova/o of 2 July 1990, is published in 'Official Gazette’ of Kosova/o 
No. 10-22/90.
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independence and its democratic determination to live independently and with its laws and 
independent political organization.
The Constitution Declaration advanced the position of Kosova/o from an autonomous 
unit to an independent and equal unit with the other federal units of the former 
Yugoslavia.
The text of the Declaration is very short, and apart from its short preamble is contains six 
points. In the first part of the Declaration it is confirmed that through the authentic 
constitutional will of the population of Kosova/o and of its Parliament has been expressed 
as an act of its political self-determination within Yugoslavia. Under the second point, on 
the basis of the authentic democratic principle on respecting the wiU of people and human 
and national communities. The Parliament of Kosova/o expected the definition of this 
constitutive act in the Constitution of Yugoslavia and its recognition by the Yugoslav 
democratic opinion and international one. This point of the Declaration makes an 
advancement of the Albanian people, as a population in majority and one of the largest 
peoples in Yugoslavia in number, from the position of a nationality to an equal nation with 
the others in former Yugoslavia.
The revocation or annulment of the decision of the Parliament of Kosova/o to give its 
consent to the constitutional amendments in the Constitution of SR Serbia in 1989 was 
made in point four of the Declaration, where it is emphasized that the Parliament and state 
bodies in Kosova/o wiU base their relations in constitutional regulations of Yugoslavia to
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the final legal implementation of this Declaration, on the Constitution of SFRY of 1974. 
With this Declaration ‘ipso jure’ are derogated aU acts which have link legally Kosova/o 
with Serbia according to the legal ”ex posterior derogate lex prior”. Under point five the 
Parhament of Kosova/o expressed its disagreement with the Serbian name of Kosova/o 
and its determination to communicate pubhcly only with the name Kosova. And, finally, 
point six of the Declaration says that the Declaration is put into effect on the day of its 
approval."
This Declaration is approved at time when Yugoslavia stiU exist and none of the federal 
unites had not expressed the will for separation from Yugoslavia, because of that the 
position of Kosova/o according to the Declaration is foreseen within the Yugoslav 
federation. The procedure of voting was not entkely valid , because it had been made on 
the haU of the Parliament for the Serbian regime didn’t allow Albanian delegates to enter 
the Parliament. Yet, it sent out an unexpectedly strong symbolic signal for the ftiture 
relations between Kosova/o and Serbia.
1.2. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosova/o (7  September, 1990 )
With the view of putting into life the Constitutional Declaration of 2 July, 1990, the 
Parliament of Kosova/o approved and proclaimed the Constitution of the Repubhc of 
Kosova/o with all the required documents in the city of Kacanik, on 7 September 1990 the
For full text in English, see, Alush Gashi, The Denial..p.242-243. 
N.Malcolm, Kosovo. . .p.346.
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passed also the Law on Political Association of the Citizens, the Law on Elections, as well 
as other requLed deeisions for the moment work of the Parliament of Kosova/o its 
relations with the Parliament of SFRY.''
The Constitution of the Republic of Kosova/o presents a historic act by which the 
Albanian people realized their historic aspirations from which they had been banned and 
discriminated against for five decades in the past by Serbian and Yugoslav regimes. The 
approval of the Constitution marks the realization of their legitimate requests, that began 
to be ai'ticulated on the Yugoslav political scene by the Albanian demostrations in 1968 
and 1981,1989 when the dominant political request was to constitute Kosova/o as a 
republic with equal rights with the other republics in the former Yugoslavia.
Unlike the Constitution of SAP of Kosova/o of 1974, the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosova/o of 7 September 1990 contains quite a short text (introduction and nine chapters) 
that defines an organization of Kosova/o as politically and constitutionally completely 
independent from Serbia. Using the positive and constitutional solutions to, and the 
experience of democratic states in Europe and the world, the Constitution of the Republic 
of Kosova/o constitutes a form of state regulation based on the sovereignty of peoples 
and citizens, freedom of organization and political action of citizens, plurality of forms of 
property, economy of free market and the legislature as basis of the constitutional and 
political system.
■* The Constitution of the Republic of Kosova/o. approved on 7 September.l990.daily “Dielli” Zagreb, 
1990.
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The general provisions of the fu'st chapter determine first of all that the Republic of 
Kosova/o is a democratic state of the Albanian nation and of the members of other nations 
and national minorities of the Serbs, Turks, Moslems, Montenegrins, Croats, Romanians 
and other living in Kosova. The Republic of Kosova/o was conceived as a parliamentary 
Republic. The direct election of the President by the electoral body does not renege this 
character. There have been cases when at the head of Parliamentary Republic were elected 
by people. Such was the German Republic, actually .the Austrian Republic etc.
Ai'ticle 75 first guarantee the liberty of expressing national origin, alongside with the 
liberty of expressing the national culture and the use of the language and its writing. 
Besides, the question of minorities is treated in another aidicle 68. It foresees that from the 
elementary schools to the faculties, conditions are secured to take lessons in the mother 
tongue in the Albanian, Serbo-Croatian and Turkish languages respectivly. In article 67 
paragraph 3 it is noted: “ In the schools financed by pubhc revenues, schooling is free of 
charge”. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosova/o recognizes for the national 
minorities the right to use their symbols, according to the conditions and in a manner 
arranged by law.
The approval of the Resolution for the Republic of Kosova as an Independent and 
Sovereign State created a new constitutional situation that requested adequate changes 
and supplements to the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova/o of 7 September 1990. In 
this way, the Parliament of Kosova approved Amendment I and amendment II-VI on 19
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October, 1991 by which it made changes of the adequate provisions of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Kosova/o.'^
Since these amendments define new constitutional solutions, by Amendment I the 
Republic of Kosova/o was proclaimed as a sovereign and independent state. With this 
definition article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova/o was changed. It had 
supposed Kosova/o to be within the Yugoslav community. Amendment II applies the 
institution of the President of the Republic as an individual state head, who takes over all 
the competencies defined by the Constitution for the collective Presidency of Kosova/o. 
Amendment III determines the function of the President of the republic.^
Amendment IV defines the conditions and procedure for electing the President of the 
Republic by the citizens in a free and direct elections with secret votes. (Amendment IV 
point 1).Amendments V and VI have mainly technical character since they define that 
special constitutional law that would be passed for the implementation of amendments II 
and VI. The main goal of these amendments were to declare Kosova/o a sovereign and 
independent state and to change the leadership of Kosova/o from a Presidency into a 
President, individual leadership.
 ^ See: Amendament I and Amendment II-VI to the Constitution of the R.of Kosova/o approved by the 
Parliament on 19 October,1991.Text provided by LDK.
See: Amendment III to the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova/o.point 1-15.
The Constitutional Declaration of Kosova/o, of 2 July 1990 and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Kosova/o have expressed the will of the Albanian people in Yugoslavia and 
were out of any ideological influence of the Communist Pai'ty.’
1.3. The Referendum on the Independence ( 26-30 September, 1991)
In the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as a consequence of political talks about the 
definition of the Federation, the process of its disintegration began and it was cai’ried out 
through the proclamation of independence of the four federal units, that approved 
declarations on their sovereignty, through referendums.
Being included in these democratic processes, the Parliament of Kosova/o in September 
1991 made its decision to organize a national referendum on the Republic of Kosova/o as 
an Independent and Sovereign state. This referendum was held in Kosova/o between 26- 
30 September, 1991, and the great majority ( over 99 % of the eligible voters voted at this 
referendum) opted for Kosova/o as a sovereign and independent state.
The National Referendum on Kosova/o as an Independent and Sovereign state presents an 
act of democratic and political self-determination of the Albanian people with the view of 
defining the constitutional and political status of Kosova/o after the dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia.
’ Gazmend Zajmi, Vepra...p .l5 ).
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Supporting the concept of the Repubhc of Kosova/o as an independent and sovereign 
state, the Albanian people declared themselves in a democratic way for full freedom, 
independence and sovereignty from Serbia.* Accordingly, it may be concluded that this 
Referendum presents a legitimate political act of the Albanian people, who together with 
other peoples of former Yugoslavia was incorporated into the new democratic processes, 
that every people, and Albanians too, should be given an opportunity for realisation of 
the right to self-determination.
Basing itself on the results of the Referendum the Parliament of Kosova/o proclaimed the 
Resolution of the Republic of Kosova/o as an Independent and Sovereign state on 18 
October 1991. By this resolution, it was confirmed the positive declaration of the 
Albanian people for full sovereignty and independence of Kosova/o. The approval of this 
resolution is a logical consequence of the process of dissolution of the Yugoslav 
federation and the creation of new states in its soil. Other republics, such as Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia previously approved similar resolutions.
This option has become all the more an indivisible part of national conscience of the 
Albanian population who has attached all its political will to the full sovereignty and 
independence of Kosova/o^
* Arsim Bairami, E Dreita Kushtetuese II. Prishtine, 1997. p. 122. ( In English: Arsim Bajrami, The 
Constitutional Law II. Prishtina, 1997. p. 122.)
’ a . Bajrami, E Dreita Kiishtetiiese. p. 123.
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On December 1991,the Government of Kosova/o in exile, headed by the Prime Minister 
Bujar Bukoshi, handed over to the EC its request for the international recognition of 
Kosova/o as an independent and sovereign state.*** Yet, the political wiU of the Albanians 
of Kosova/o, expressed by Referendum, for a sovereign and independent state, until now 
has been recognized only by Albania.
1.4. Parliamentary and Presidential Elections ( 24 May 1992 and 22 March 1998 ).
After the approval of constitutional amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosova/o ( October 1991 ) it was created constitutional basis for organizing the first 
free and multiparty democratic elections, for the Parliament and the President of the 
Republic.
The old one-party Parliament of Kosova/o, announced on 2 May 1992 the multiparty, 
general and Presidential elections, to be held on 24 May 1992. In these elections the 
people of Kosova/o had for the first time the possibility to declare themselves freely for 
the election the main bodies of the Republic of Kosova/o. The voting participation was in 
mass.
At these elections, in conformity with the Constitution and the Law on Elections, 100 
deputies were elected for the Parliament of Kosova/o and also the President of the
For full text,see; The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania and Institute of History (ed), The 
Truth on Kosova. Copyright ©by Encyclopedia Publishing house, Tirana, 1993. pp.341-343.
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Republic. In conformity with the Law on Elections, political parties proposed the 
candidates for deputies of the Parliament of Kosova/o, as well as other political 
movements, associations of the citizens and other subjects foreseen by law. Since this law 
combined the majority and proportion principles , out of 130 deputies of the Parliament of 
Kosova/o, 100 of them were elected directly, while other 30 were elected later by the 
principle of proportional representation of political parties that won a certain percentage 
of the votes, including an adequate representation of the political parties that gather 
national minorities that live in the Republic of Kosova/o. The President of the Republic 
was elected in a democratic way, with secret votes.
The Democratic League of Kosova/o (LDK) won 76.4% of the votes and got 96 deputies, 
while the Parliamentary Party of Kosova/o (PPK) got 4.86 % and had 13 deputies. Other 
successful parties were the Peasants Party of Kosova/o (7 deputies) and the Albanian 
Christian Democratic Party (7 deputies).In the Presidential election, Ibrahim Rugova, the 
popular and charismatic leader of the LDK,won by an overwhelming majority.
In voting process, together with Albanians have participated also Turks, Muslims etc. 
Serbs did not participate for they considered the voting to be a illegal process. The 
Parliament has attempt only once, on 24 June 1992, to meet, but was not allowed by the 
Serbian forces. After that date the work of the Parliament had been done through the 
Parlamentarian Commissions, which was more or less an improvisation rather than an 
effective work.
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Until May of 1998 elections were postponed several times between 1996 and 1998,three 
times for the Parliament ( which had a four-year term ) and twice for the President, whose 
term is five years.“ On December 24, 1997, when the mandate of the shadow Parliament 
and President were to expire once again, Rugova announced new elections for 22 March 
1998. Despite the elections of 1992, when all political factors of Kosova/o had supported 
the elections, in the 1998 elections political factors were divided.
After the events in the Drenica region, when the armed conflict in Kosova/o begun, the 
new factor in Kosova/o, Kosova Liberation Army (UCK-KLA) was categorically against 
the elections. In a statement published in "Koha Ditore", the KLA said that the elections 
should be put off 'because of the state of emergency in Kosova/o and the state of war in 
Drenica'. The KLA also announced that it will not recognize elections 'until the country is 
liberated' and accused Rugova of 'causing discord among Kosova/o Albanians.“ . Also 
the PPK and so other small parties refused to participate in these elections for the same 
reason. Because of the situation of war, the elections could not be held in the Drenica 
region, in the muncipaUties of Skenderaj, GUogovc and Kiln respectivly. In other parts of 
Kosova/o the majority of people of Kosova/o participated in the elections.
“ International Crisis Group (ed), Kosova Spring. Copyright © ICG. Prishtina, 1997. p.29.
Gazeta ditore ne gjuhen shqipe “Koha Ditore”. Prishtine, 19 Mars 1998. ( In English; Daily newspaper 
in Albanian language, “Koha Ditore’’. Prishtina, 19 March 1998).
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The elections for the Parliament and the President of Kosova/o (May 1992 and March 
1998) have not had a big impact on building of the institutions of Kosova/o, but judging 
by the number of their participants they were a sort of referendum on sovereignty and 
independence of K o s o v a / o . T h e  results of the March 1998 elections were the same 
as 1992 elections. The fate of the institutions were similar as weU, that is, their creation 
remained half way.
2. The parallel life in Kosova/o and Serbia's response to it
Following the abolition of the Kosova/o's autonomy in 1989, the Albanians refused to 
accept the legitimacy of Serbian rule, proclaimed Kosova/o as an Independent Republic 
and strongly advocated the peaceful strategy to resolve the Albanian-Serbian conflict. 
Since the early 1990s, the Albanians were able to make decisions over a wide range of 
political, economic, social and cultural issues without interference from Serbia.*^
Albanians of Kosova/o refused to participate in Serbian and Yugoslav political life. They 
have systematically boycotted the Yugoslav and Serbian elections since 1991,considering 
them as events happening in a foreign country.
G.Zajmi, Vepra...p.l46 .
Elez BiberaJ, Kosova: The Balkan power keg. Tirana, 1996. p. 161.
15 Tihomir Loza, The Kosova Albanians. p.20
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Organizing the parallel Albanian society, their own political institutions, educational and 
health-care systems, cultural , and sports ones, emerged as a hallmark of the Kosovar 
Albanians peaceful resistance to Serbian rule. Kosova/o Albanians responded in 1991 by 
forming a shadow government, complete with a president, a parliament and a tax system. 
The Government of Kosova/o, though, had no army or police whom it could deploy, that 
is, it was not a government in effective control of its territory and p o p u l a t i o n . A  
'temporary' coalition government was formed on 19 October 1991, comprised of six 
ministers. All but one of the ministers live abroad. Prime Minister and at the same time 
Foreign Minister is Bujai' Bukoshi (a physician, urology specialist and former LDK 
secretary). The health minister was the only minister who live and work in Kosova/o. The 
shadow government plays an important role by collecting 'taxes' abroad. All Kosovas in 
the diaspora are supposed to contribute 3 percent of their income to the funds of the 
Republic of Kosova/o. This helped to finance political activity, the education system and 
health care.
a) Education
According to the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, as an autonomous province Kosova/o had 
full decision making authority over all levels of education, primary, secondary and higher 
education. Classes in the province’s primary schools were held in Albanian, Serb and 
Turkish. University was in Albanian and Serbian language. At the beginning of the 
1991/92, the Serbian forces prevented Kosova/o Albanian teachers and students from
Michael Salla, Kosovo. Non-violence and the break-up of Yugoslavia."Security Dialogue" Vol.26 No.4 
December 1995.pp.434-435.
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entering their school premises. In early January, the majority of the Albanian language 
secondary schools started to work the second term (semester) in private homes. Prishtina 
University soon followed on 26 November 1991.
The parallel Albanian-language education system in Kosova/o served a total of 266.413 
primai'y schools pupils, 58.700 secondary schools students, and 16.000 university students, 
an undertaking on a scale that has no parallel Work of these educational institutions 
was developed according to the curriculum approved by Kosova/o's organs. During these 
time the big number of books is published based on a new developments in science and 
with escape of imposed communist ideology during the communist regime.
On 1 September 1996, Rugova and Milosevic, signed an agreement on the normalization 
of the education in Kosova/o. Mediator was San Egidio, a Rome based church 
organization. With this agreement, so called Rome Agreement, it was foreseen the return 
of the Albanian students and teachers to their premises. This agreement was never realized 
and is used by the Serbian regime for political purposes. The Agreement did not deal with 
the curriculum, recognition of diplomas, the division of school premises or institutions in 
different languages, and only temporarily was meant to resolve thye financial situation.
Rugova used the Agreement to point out that he was being officially recognized because 
Milosevic dealt with him. But the document (signed separately in Prishtina and Belgrade 
respectivly) carries for Milosevic his official tittle (President of Serbia) and for Rugova
17 Kosova Spring..p .51.
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only his name. The 3+3 Implementation Commission met several times, but failed to 
register any progress. This was mostly because the Serb side interpreted the Agreement as 
meaning that Kosova/o's students would be reintegrated into the Serbian education 
system, whereas the Kosovar side understood it as allowing Kosova's students to come 
back to aU premises without conditions.
b) Health care
in July and August 1990,health care in Kosova/o came under Serbian 'emergency 
measures’ that rapidly led to a large-scale filing of the Albanian workers. The boycott of 
the Serbian health care system by Albanians was almost as comprehensive as that of the 
educational system.
The main institution within the parallel health system was the humanitarian organization 
Mother Theresa. (The institution is named after the recently deceased Catholic nun who, 
before her death, was the most famous ethnic Albanian in the world. Mother Theresa was 
born in Skopje. She was the winner of Nobel Price for Peace).
Albanians of Kosova/o were proud of their parallel health care system and, given the 
adverse conditions, they managed to set up an impressive net of health care institutions.'* 
The pai'allel systems of education and health service set up by Kosova/o Albanians were 
clearly not satisfactory entii'ely based on modern standai'ds.
18 Kosova Spring.,p.62.
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Radio and Television of Prishtina (RTVP) was taken over by the Serbian authorities on 5 
July 1990. RTVP still had some Albanian language programming, but it was only a 
translation of what the Serb desk officers produced and therefore Albanians generally 
choose not to watch it. The Albanians of Kosova/o usually watched the Satellite TV. It 
was so because these was set up a common TV program via satellite. It was paid in equal 
parts by TV Tirana and Kosova/o's shadow government and offers information, debates, 
round tables, talk shows, children's programs and music. In Kosova/o were also published 
some daily newspaper and wekly, aU with private funding.
Most jobs were in the service sector or commerce, with international organizations, or 
involved black-market sales of cigarettes and alcohol. Kosova had some 18.000 registered 
small firms. Business could not break down some barriers between Serbs and Albanians as 
it was beUeved.'^
19 Kosova Spring...P.63.
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Internationally, despite the fact that Kosova/o had not recognized, collectively or 
individually as a state, only by Albania, has created a solid capacity of representational 
capacity in international relations. Kosova/o had 11 offices. Only the Office of the 
Republic of Kosova/o in Tirana-Albania had a diplomatic s t a t us . On 20 December 1996 
it was founded the Office of Kosova/o in Istambul-Turkey. From international side, the 
fu'st international office in Kosova/o was the United States Information Office (USIS), 
opened on 5 June 1 9 9 6 . Also the meetings of leader of Kosova/o, Ibrahim Rugova, and 
other personalities with the representatives of many states, like President of USA, GB, 
France, Germany, Turkey and international organization such as UN, EU etc. were in the 
function of internationalizing the Kosova/o issue.
The creation of the new states is a matter of fact and not a legal issue. With the 
appearance of the new state, it becames the subject of international law.'" States can 
exist without international recognition. The existence of the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, 
during the 27 years, despite the facts that it is recognized only by Turkey, proves 
practically that a state can exist without international recognition.
The Republic of Kosova/o as weU has functioned, under occupation, with these main 
characteristics:
Blerim Reka , Dimensioni nderkombetar i ndertimit te Republikes se Kosoves."Vietari’.*. 1996.Prishtine. 
pp.94-95. ( In English:Blerim Reka, International dimension of building of the Republic of Kosova/o. 
“Annual” 1996. Prishtina, pp.94-95.)
Gazeta ditore ne gjuhen shqipe, “Buiku”. 6.qershor, 1996. ( Daily newspaper in albanian language, 
“Buiku”. 6 June. 1996.
■■ Zejnullah Gruda:E dreita nderkombetare publike.Prishtine.1984 p.66. ( In English: Zejnullah Gruda, 
International public law. Prishtina, 1984.p.66.)
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-The majority of the population of Kosova/o did not participate in the political and legal 
life of Serbia-Yugoslavia;
-Albanian political parties have developed their own activity as a part of the political life 
of the Republic of Kosova/o under circumstances of foreign occupation 
-The institution of the Republic of Kosova/o, according to its own Constitution, had 
functioned, some partes inside of Kosova/o and some parts of it in exile;
The issue when the institutions of Kosova/o could function within its territory and with 
full competencies was the issue of the balance of forces. In scientific aspect it is known 
that the balance of forces could change.
3. The outbrust of the conflict in Kosova/o-causes and consequences
3.1. The appearance of the UCK ( The Kosova/o Liberation Army; KLA ).
In 1990s, Kosova/o passed firom an autonomous Province to a classical-type colony. The 
outburst of conflict in Kosova/o was a consequence of three developments:
-fu'st, the Serb-Yugoslav government showed little indication that it was seeking a 
genuine compromise with the Albanian population;
-second, growing sectors of the Albanian population became disenchanted with the 
peaceful approach of their leaders;
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-third, the international community had been increasingly perceived in Kosova/o as
unwilling to promote a peaceful solution to the crisis. 23
The Albanians desire to break free from Serbia was not an aspiration born in the context 
of Yugoslavia’s breakdown. The roots of Serbian-Albanian mistrust run deep. Since 1912 
when Kosova/o was occupied by Serbia after the Balkans Wars the Albanian had been 
striving to escape from the Serbian rule.
Rugova held out a hope that the conflict could be resolved by negotiations with the 
Serbs. He urged his fellow Albanians not to give Serbia a pretext for carrying out a 
campaign of ethnic cleansing.''* The pent-up frustration of close to a decade of waiting 
without any hint of light at the end of the tunnel, and the precedents for achieving political 
goals by military means set up by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Republika Serpska, 
played into the hands of hotheads who were prepared to fight for an independent 
Kosova/o.
Jansuz Bugajski, Close to the Edge in Kosovo. ‘T he Washington Quartely”. Summer 1998 Vol.2I No.3 
pp. 19-23.
Elez Biberaj, Kosova...pp. 165-166.
78
Peaceful policy of Kosova/o Albanians leadership, save the verbal support, did not have 
any other support to change this situation. Under these circumstances, Serbian 
occupation, the majority of the Kosovar Albanians did not see any perspective, especially 
the youth. Albanian willingness to compromise on selected non-pohtical issues like 
returning their children to schools has foundered on Serbian intransigence.The collapse 
of the Rome agreement on education had a profoundly negative effect on the prospects 
for a situation in Kosova/o.
Over the last years, Milosevic never offered the Kosova/o Albanians anything more than 
that status quo.'^ After so many years of repression people in general, naturally take 
encouragement from violent actions. Kosova/o Albanians in the most cynical prevision of 
theii’ formerly peaceful stance, will learn the pohtical value of counting the dead-if nothing
else.27
The Kosova/o Albanians have been under siege for a long time. Serbs have always treated 
them as a second-class citizens, and they have lived under effective police control 
throughout the 1990s.Denied equal access to education, health-care, and employment, 
Kosova Albanians have been regularly subject to human rights abuses.
Warren Zimmerman, The demons...p .6
Tihomir Loza, A Milosevic all seasons. ‘Transitions”. Vol.5 No. 10 October, 1998. p.410. 
Anthony Borden, Contorting Independence. ”Transitions”.Vol.5 No.7 July 1998.p.3.
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The west has allowed Millosevic considerable latitude in his repression in Kosova/o. 
Milosevic believes the West will sacrifice Kosova/o to keep him engaged with Bosnian 
peace efforts. If httle international effort has been spent on resolving the Kosova/o dispute 
this decade, its because there was no urgent need, it takes two sides to 
make a proper war, and Kosova/o Albanians did not engage pursuing a disciplined 
strategy of nonviolence. Kosova/o was perceived as a problem of human rights, not of 
pohtical rights and territorial status.
When m the relations between two peoples are pressed the humanitarian rights of one 
part, we can not accept that this is a case of brutal behavior of state, but this is issue of the 
pressure on pohtical will of these people for independence and equahty. The essence of 
the Kosova’s/o problem has been the pressure of Serbian regime on the pohtical wih of 
Kosovar Albanians for freedom and independence..N obody can not feU that he has fuU 
humanitarian rights if for their fate can decide somebody else.
Unfortunately, the individual recognition of the FRY(Serbia and Montenegro)after the 
Dayton Peace Accords estabhshed a very bad precedent by legahzing to a certain extent 
the use of force and ethnic cleansing as a means for achieving pohtical goals. Since then, 
the Kosova people and its leadership has showed a signs of serious disihusionment 
regarding their peaceful pohcy way as a means to achieving the independent statehood.^®
28 Tihomir Loza, Kosovo Albanians....p .17.
Gazmend Zajmi, V epra...p. 14.
Fabian Shchmidt, Teaching wrong lessons in Kosovo. “Transitions”. Vol.2 No. 14 July, 1996. pp.37-40. 
Also, Jansuz Bugajski, The Kosovar Volcano. ’Transition” Vol.4 No.5. October ,1997. pp.66-72.
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Former president of USA George Bush warned the Serbian leadership in 
December,1992,that United States would use firce if Serbia were to extend thee war to 
Kosova/o. Bush’s message reportedly said that;”in the event of conflict in Kosova/o 
caused by Serbian action the United Stats will be prepared to employ military force 
against the Serbs in Kosova/o and in Serbia propeer’. '^ These threat is repeated also by 
Clinton administration. For domestic purposes, Kosovar politicians often misrepresent 
the US government’s strong stance on human rights as support for Kosova/o’s
independence. 32
The explosive situation in Kosova/o was the concern of many analysts. Thus, the Turkish 
analyst in one reaction express that peace in Kosova/o is fragile and she holed by threats 
of large-scale bombing of Serbia itself and the presence of Americans troops in 
Macedonia. Without these threatens, notice author: "Lord Owen misht well have had to
negotiate over yet another genocide".3 3
It is ironic that the Dayton accord of 1995,which produced the uneasy peace in Bosnia, 
was probably the signal event in the formation of an armed insugerency in Kosova/o. The 
leadership in the capital, Prishtina, watched in disbelief as the fate of Kosova/o was never 
raised inn Dayton, and as other Yugoslav groups that had mounted ai'med rebellions 
achieved recognition and even independence. The most serious Plan for solution of
David Binder; Bush Warns Serbs No to widen war. ’’The New York Times”.December 28, 1992. p.A6 
Kosova Spring, p.24.
Hasan Unal, Trop de Zele. ‘The National Interest”. No.43. Spring, 1996. p.95.
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Kosova/o problem, until 1998, was the France-German plan. Despite of many benefits for 
Yugoslavia if they accept this plan, Yugoslav foreign minister Milan Milutinovic rejected 
project.
The gulf between Kosova Albanians and the Serbs is huge. In 1997 have been three 
meetings between Albanians and Serbs, in New York(7-9April),in Vienna (18-20 April) 
and Ulcinj-Montenegro (23-25 June) but without any s u c c e s s . Th e  crisis in Kosova/0 
erupted suddenly, but not unexpectedly. Years of international attention on the Balkans, 
endless discussion of ;preventive diplomacy’ and early warning mechanisms’, may have
come to nothing. 35
For many years UCK was almost mythical. Its name was used at the trials of Albanians. 
Since evidence in these trials was often dubious, so were the references to UCK. The first 
public appearance was dramatic and carefully staged, three armed men in camouflage 
uniforms and black baklavas arrived suddenly at a funeral of an Albanian killed in a 
gunfight with Serbian police. ’We are the Kosova/o Liberation Army, the true 
representatives of the Kosova struggle, they declared to enthusiastic shouts from the 
crowd of 15.000 . The Albanian movement had ‘officially’ gone violent. That episode.
34 Kosova Spring., p.24.
Shkelzen Maliqi, Beyond Drenica. ‘Transitions”. Vol.5 No.4 . April, 1998. p.3.
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from 28 November 1997,is taken the first direct confrontation of an armed Albanian 
grouping. Otherwise the first notable action was the ambush of a Serbian police vehicle 
in may 1993.^^
Within the political subject of Kosovar Albanians were different stance about the 
appearance of KLA. Indeed late as the end of January 1998 Rugova said that there were 
indications that UCK was an organization run by Serbian secret service, and suggested 
that thee service might bee preparing wide operations likely to cause ‘unprecedented 
bloodshed in Kosova/o’.^  ^ PPK chairman Adem Demaci stole the show from Rugova by 
acknowledging UCKs existence well in advance of thee recent violence. In December 
1997 he said: "There is no doubt that the UCK exist. UCKs emergence proves that the 
people are prepared to pay the highest price for their freedom".'
They (KLA) were first concentrated into the Drenica region near the Skenderaj. This was 
done, most probably, due to thee geographic configuration of the terrain, but as well due 
to the widespread support of the region’s population for KLA.
The KLA managed within a short time to create a free security zone and banned the 
entry of the Serbian forces in that area. Against this reality, Serbia did not remain 
indifferent and attacked thee region on 4-5 march 1998 with heavy artillery were more 
than 87 Kosova/o Albanians killed and massacred, including women, children and 
elderly. This attack was especially against the Jashari family from Prekazi I Ulet,
Tihomir Loza, Kosova Albanians...p.31. 
■”  VIP. 29 January, 1998.
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whereby its 27 members were killed and massacred including among them Adem Jashari. 
This name would later become a symbol of the resistance against the Serbian occupying 
regime and hero for the Kosova/o Albanians. Adem Jashari in Januai'y 1999 was declared
as a honorable Commandant of KLA.39
Despite of public appearance of KLA in November 1997, the direct confrontation with 
Serbian forces, and same time the beginning of armed conflict in Kosova/o is considered 
last February and beginning of march 1998,respectivly the attack and massacres on 
Prekaz I Ulet. The powder keg, whose explosion has so often been predicted during the 
past decade, appears finally to be igniting. According to the chairman of the Political 
Affairs Committee of thee Albanian Parliament, Sabri Godo. it marked the end of the
peaceful policy in Kosova/o 40
After this attack the police claimed to have destroyed the UCK leadership. But in reality 
it has only fostered massively increased support, both in terms of recruits and cash. The 
sympathies for thee KLA have been growing since it boosts the moral of the Kosova/o 
Albanians for thee resistance to the Serbia regime and for the fact that its actions were the 
first ones that the international community took seriously the Kosova issue. Within a very 
short period of time, the KLA gained a wide support among the Kosovar Albanians and 
nobody denies the necessary need for its existence.
·’* VIP. 9 December, 1997.
Komunikata nr.71 e SHP te UCK,botuar ne ‘Koha Ditore" 25.1.1999. ( In English: Statement No. 71 of 
HQ of KLA, published in "Koha Ditore". 25.1.1999.)
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The appearance into the scene of thee KLA raised the hopes among the Albanians for 
liberation of Kosova/o from the occupying force of Serbian regime. Yet, there two groups 
in Kosova/o that are divided on this issue. The first one things that it should exist inn 
parallel with Rugova’s peaceful policy, while the second group is of opinion that it 
should the only force, political and military. The KLA is being reinforced by Albanians 
returning from jobs in Western Europe and locally by young Albanians men who have 
known nothing but Serbian oppression and feel that they have nothing to lose.“*^
In times of tension, such as in February and March 1998,Albanians from all states close 
the ranks and forget any difference that they may have. Albanians in Albania were 
mobilized under slogan: ‘One nation, aoe stance”' Albanian diplomacy of those days was 
offensive as well. Also Albanians in Macedonia, Montenegro in Diaspora etc. No 
historical precedent for thee present level of the homogenization of the Albanian people.
The current institutions of Kosova/o, President, Parliament, Government etc. did not 
recognize formally KLA as s their defense force. But, people of Kosova/o has fully 
support KLA. The formal recognition of KLA by the current institutions will be e most 
benefit for better organization of liberation war.
TVSH. 7 March, 1998.
Warren Zimmerman, The Demons of Kosova, p.7.
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The fii'st meeting of foreign officials with the members of KLA was ‘accidentally’
¿19meeting of American ambassador Hoolbroke in. This meeting have made inspiration 
for young Albanians to be member of KLA because of feelings that they have support 
from USA. For short time the KLA become a very important factor in Kosova/o, most 
important for finding solution in Kosova/o crisis. Thus in Conference of Rumbuillet-
France they have been ^'invited and head of Kosova/o’s delegation was leader of KLA. 4 3
KLA is a result of permanent violence of Serbian forces against the Kosovars, also is a 
result of long time unsuccessful peaceful policy, and over whole is a will of Kosovars, 
especially the youths to live free and independent from Serbia despite the sacrifices. 
“Wee learned that violence works. It is the only way in this part of the World to achieve 
what you want and get the attention of the international community.
TVSH. 'Buiku'· 'Koha Ditore'.
43
44
See: Informations about the Conference in Rambuillet.
Deklarata e nie eprori anonim te UCK dhene ne gazeten ‘Bujku” mars 23 1998. (In English: Declaration 
of one unamed leader of KLA given to "Bujku” March 23, 1998.)
43 See informations about the Conference in Rambuillet
Deklarata e nie eprori anonim te UCK dhene ne gazeten ‘Bujku” mars 23 1998. (In English: Declaration 
of aone unamed leader of KLA given to "Bujku" March 23, 1998.)
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3. 2. Reaction of the international community
Policy must fulfill his duty, like what has said Maurice Diverger: "the main priority of 
pohcy is elimination of violence, the bloody conflicts must replace with other softy manner 
of war, policy is war, at same time is limitation of war by force”.
Kosova/s potential to create a humanitarian disaster and destabilize European security has 
been widely understood since Yugoslavia fell apart in 1991 The conflict in Kosova/o may 
led and will probably lead into a wider Balkan conflict, involving Albania, Macedonia, 
Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey, as well as the USA and Russia."** In the event of ethnic 
fighting in Kosova/o, the conflict will be more difficult to isolate than in Bosnia. The full 
out from ethnic conflict in Kosova/o may also he damaging to the peace process in 
Bosnia.
These were some of reasons why after the recent events, there 'candle was it' and the 
powder keg was about to explode and it pushed the awareness of the international 
community. There were individual reactions of the states like it was the case with Albania, 
Turkey, USA, France, Germany etc. but as well collective reactions of the international 
community, most notably that of the Contact Group, the OSCE, Council of Europe, 
European Union, NATO and lastly the United Nations.
Maurice Duverger, Uvod u politiku. Savremena administaracija. Beograd,1996.p.l02. ( In English; 
Entrance to politics. Temporary administration. Belgrade, 1996.p.l02.)
Ysemin Dobra-Manco, Albanian democracy takes root. “Turkish Review of Balkan Studies”..Annual 
1996/97. Vol.3 p.21.
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community, most notably that of the Contact Group, the OSCE, Council of Europe, 
European Union, NATO and lastly the United Nations.
Both Serbs and Albanians watch and analyze every US diplomatic move in the Balkans, 
often reading for more into actions than was ever intended by the individuals concerned.
The United States has maintained the 'outer wall' of sanctions, excluding Yugoslavia from 
international financial institutions, but until the Drenica massacre in early March 1998,did 
not apply and forceful pressure to resolve the Kosova/o issue. The official position of 
Washington and Western Europe has been to call for enhanced status within the FRY 
while proctoring the rights of the Albanians in accordance with the Organization for 
security and Cooperation in Europe and the United nations Charter principles. After the 
massacre, the US called for something between autonomous and republic status for 
Kosova/o within Yugoslavia.
The only option that would cause Milosevic to address the Kosova/o issues seriously and 
immediately is direct US military intervention.
Kosova Spring..p.94
Tihomir Loza, Kosova Albanians, p.35.
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Secretai-y of State Madeleine Albright and deputy secretary of State Strobe Talbot, in 
particular, been outspoken in their criticism of Serbia, and especially Milosevic, since the 
upsurge of violence. Miss. Albright has warned Milosevic that he will pay a high price, 
saying; "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosova/o 
what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia".'^* She beheves that :the one 
thing (Milosevic)truly understands is decisive and fu’m action on the part of the 
international community. Talbot has gone even further, ordering Serbia to 'cease its brutal 
repressive campaign which involves ethnic cleansing, summary executions and mass 
expulsions', and warning that: "Belgrade will bear full responsibility for bringing the 
viability of their own state into jeopardy".
In other hand, Turkish President Sylejman Demirel wrote to his Yugoslav counterpart 
Milosevic saying: "Leaders are persons who are invited by their people to come forward 
with remarkable courage and wise initiatives in the hard days of h isto ry".T urkey  has 
strong historical links with Kosova/o and has forged close military ties with Albania since 
the end of the Cold war. As during the Bosnian war, Russia has adopted a obdurate, 
proserbian position. Russia considered Kosova/o to be an internal Serbian matter.
.■>1 Reuters,7 march 1998
Reuters,18 march 1998. 
Reuters,9 march 1998
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For the fu'st time, the Contact Group convened on 9-march 1998 to address the issue of 
Kosova/o only. In its statement, the Contact group asked, interalia, to immediately start 
the negotiations between the FRY(Serbia and Montenegro) and the representatives of the 
Kosovar Albanians, within the days and without preconditions. Former Spanish Prime 
minister, Fihpe Gonzales, was appointed as a special EU-OSCE and the Contact group 
envoy to mediate the c r i s i s . C o n t a c t  Group 'supports an enhancement status for 
Kosova/o within the Federal Republic of former Yugoslavia and recognizes that this 
must include meaningful self - administration. The Contact Group supports neither 
independence nor the maintenance of the status quo.
The UN Security Council adopted a Resolution on 31 march 1998.This was the second 
ti'^hne that UN Security Council discusses the issue of Kosova/o, fu'st time being in the 
1993 whereby it asked for the unconditional return of the OSCE monitoring missions for 
Kosova, Sandjak and Vojvodina. The resolution of SC of 31 march 1998 is based in 
stance of Contact Group ( France, Germany, Italy, Russia, England and USAjmeeting of 
9 and 25 March 1998 and in the OSCE Permanent Council meeting of 11 march 1998 
when the main point was ai'ms embargo.
By this Resolution called FRY immediately to take the further necessary steps to achieve 
a political solution to the Kosova/o issue through dialogue.(Point 1 of Res.).Claimed turn
Deklarata e Grupit te Kontaktit. “Informatori ditor”, 9 mars 1998. ( In English: Declaration of Contact 
Group. “Daily News”, 9 March 1998.)
55See: Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th meeting, on 
31 March 1998.Published in International community and Kosova/o. Collection relevant documents. 
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (ed). November, 1998, Beograd .
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back of OSCE long-term missions of the OSCE and EU, Filipe Gonzales.(Point 7 of 
Res.).Withdrawn the special pohce units and ceased action by the security forces affecting 
the civilian population.(point 16 par. of Res.). Allowed access to Kosova/o by humanitarian 
organizations as weU as representatives of Contact group and other embassies.(point 16 
par.).Urges the office of the Prosecutor of the International tribunal estabhshed pursuant 
to resolution 827(1993) of 25 may 1993 to begin gathering information related to the 
violence in Kosova/o that may fall within its jurisdiction, and notes that the authorities of 
the Federal republic of Yugoslavia have an obligation to cooperate with the tribunal.(point 
17 of res.). In the end of Resolution they made remark for FRY if she fall to make 
constructive progress towards the peaceful solution of the situation in Kosova/o will lead 
to the consideration of additional measures.(Point 19 of Res.)
This Resolution of the UN Security Council (1160) has pohtical rather practical effects. 
Serbs have considered the main point of this Resolution about the arms embargo as a 
joking. For, as one unnamed Serb diplomat said in an interview with the Belgrade based 
newspaper "Nasa Borba": "We have to much weapons to flight in Kosova/o", or one 
other said; "it is like to ban oil import to Saudi Arabia".
The leadership of Kosova/o has make efforts to fulfill the obligations from the Resolution, 
they have created the group for negotiations(23 mars 1998).^ ,^ but in other hand the 
Serbian side have continue with their old games. Thus in 23 April they have make
56 Informatori ditor. Nr.l831. ( In English: Daily news No. 1831.)
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referendum about the interfering of international negotiators to resolve the Kosova’s /o 
problem. They have considered Kosova/o as a external issue.
The obligations from the 1160 Resolution of SC hasn’t been respect by Serbian regime. 
As the spiral of conflict in Kosova/o continues, the process of increasing internal 
intervention in the crisis also gains momentum.
That time is considered as a proper time. "The time to act is now, before large-scale 
violence makes any settlement impossible. We missed our opportunity to prevent the war 
in Bosnia, and we and Bosnia have paid the price. Leaving the issue, to the parties, as for 
Pentagon wants, is a formula for violence" said Ambassador Morton Abramovitz, a
member of the Balkan Institute Executive Council. 5 7
Serbia's escalation of violence in Kosova threatens peace in the region. It is the worse 
violence in Kosova/o since the second World War. This violence must be ended if there is 
to be any chance of a settlement in Kosova/o. This means that the US and NATO must 
become involved in the crisis.
US representative Christopher Hill(he was one of many members of Richard Holbrookes's 
team who engineered the Dayton agreement and he was a US ambassador in FYROM),
57 Statement of the Executive Committee of the Balkan Institute,March 5,1998 Washington)
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During the summer 1998 Serbia forces have undertake the big attack against the 
Albanians, especially in the areas when the KLA was present. Attacks are undertake 
with aim to destroy KLA but around 2000 civilian were killed and percent of material 
damages were very high. Despite of this action during that time international 
community didn’t undertake any activity, only any usually metting, which have been 
a routine at that time in Kosova/o.
The most notice activity of international community at that time was the Resolution 
1199(1998) of SC of UN/^ This Resolution, like resolution of Mach 1998.is based in 
stance of Contact Group meetings of 12 June 1998 and 8 July 1998,esspecialy in 
Resolution 1160,which didn’t achieve any concrete result to change the situation in 
Kosova/o, despite the situation was more worse. The especial attention by this 
Resolution was on humanitarian disaster of 250.000 settled Also the claim for dialog 
without precondition and with international· involvement.(point 3 of the 
Res.ll99).Demands further obligation for Yugoslavia, in addition to the measures 
called for under Resolution 1160 (1998),implement immediately the following concrete 
measures towards achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosova/o as 
contained in the Contact Group statement of 12 June 1998.
Also this Resolution has had a same fate of Resolution 1160,without any concrete 
result. This is announced in official meeting of Holbroke-Milosevic for signing the
agreem ent.The agreement Holbrooke-Milosevic was a result of very long
59 Resolution 1199 (1998) Adopted its 3930 meeting on 23 September 1998. Published 
Inter.comm.and Kosovo.
60 Announced in Belgrade on 13 October 1998. Published in Kosova/o and Internal. Communittee.
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conversions between them and direct threat of NATO. By these agreement, Milosevic 
is obliged: full compliance with UNSCR 1199 implementing a cease-fire; withdrawing 
deployed military and special police forces from Kosova/o and returning the rest to 
garrison; immediate access by humanitmian relief workers to Kosova/o, and 
cooperation with war crimes investigation.
Acceptance of an intrusive verification regime including OSCE 2000 monitors on the 
ground and um'estricted NATO surveillance in the airspace over Kosova/o.
Agreement on a specific timetable for completing talks with the Kosovar Albanians 
that will give Kosova/o self-government and its own local police.^^ With the aim of 
concretization of Agreement in 15 October 1998 in Belgrade came NATO Secretary 
General Havier Solana accompanied by Chairman of the Military Committee, General 
Naumann and SACEUR, General Wesley Clark. Solana in press conference in 
Belgrade, said: ”I have come to Belgrade today, to deliver a simple but strong 
message to President Milosevic. He must comply fully and immediately with the 
requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1199” and continue: ’’Let there no 
doubt: We will keep the situation in Kosova/o under the closet scrutiny...We will 
remain ready and willing to act if these obligations ai'e not met”
The main points of the NATO-Yugoslavia agreement were: 1. Serb forces must be 
withdrawn and refuges allowed to return home;2.International monitoring by land and
air;3.Timetable for autonomy talks 6 3
See: Haolbroke-Milosevic Agreement, on 13 October 199&. Published in Kosova.o and intercom, 
NATO Secretary General visit to Belgrade, Highlights of his press conference held on 15 October 
1998.Inter.comm.and Kosovo ...p.37.
Key points of NATO-Yugoslavi Agreement.Inter.comm.and Kosova/o...p.39.
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Between the Government of FRY and OSCE signed in Belgrade on 16 October 1998 
one agreement about the role of Kosova/o verification mission. This agreement has 
held five main part: 1.Establishment and termination; 2.General responsibilities and 
missions; 3. Specific terms of reference; 4. Composition and facilities; 5 Field 
presence.^"* The formal decision about this misión is aproved by OSCE Permanent
Council in 25 October 1998.65
The Agreements, Holbrooke-Milosevic, NATO-FRY, OSCE-FRY were included 
formally in Resolution of SC 1203 (1998) which was ratification of mentioned 
agreements and repealing of decisions from Resolutions 1160 and 1199 of SC.^  ^ In 
respect of these international activities, KLA in October 1998 declare unilateral cease­
fire..^  ^ It is important to mention that in all these Agreements the Albanian side didn’t 
be involved directly, despite of facts that all agreements would implemented in 
Kosova/o. By these, international community have recognize FRY sovereignty over 
Kosova/o. They have damage the international subject of Kosova/o one of main aim 
of Kosovars.
These agréments were the serious acts of international community to deal with 
Kosova/o crisis. But still is not enough, because the OSCE weren’t able to resolve the
See: Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission between the government of FRY and 
OSCE. In Inter.comm. and Kosova/o...pp.42-49.
“ See: The OSCE decision No 263. In Int.com.and Kos. p.51.
See; Security Council Resolution 1203 (19981 Adopted by the Security Council at its 3937'*' meeting, 
on 24 October 1998. Published in;Inter.comm.and Kosovo, p.35.
Komunikate Nr. 46 e SHP te UCK-se.”Buiku” 16 tetor, 1998. ( In English: Statement No. 46 of HO 
of KLA. "Bujku". October 16, 1998.)
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Kosova/o crises without the implemented force. They were unarmed persons and 
rarely exposed the Serbian violation. The Kosovo Verification Mission has protested 
to Yugoslav authorities over attacks on its members by Yugoslav Ai'my soldiers and
Serb policemen. 68
Despite of presence of OSCE mission the conflict is increased again in beginning of 
1999.Thus,in 20 March 1999 international community has take decision to withdraw 
the OSCE mission to left place for other international forces, such are NATO-s, 
because only them can be successful in such difficult crisis. Maybe in benefit of 
people of Kosova/o, international community and itself Serbia, the involving the 
NATO-s must be first.
After the offering of 4 Plans from international community thi'ough the ambassador 
Hill, which have be more test for opinions in Kosova/o and Serbia, in February 1999 
become the most serious activity was Conference in Rambuilled, France from 6-23 
February 1999 organized by Contact Group. The copresident was Robin Cook-foreign 
minister of England and Huber Vedrine-foreign minister of France. Mediators were 
ambassadors Hill-USA, Petrich-EU and Majorski-Russia.
In these Conference were present the representatives of parts in conflict, 
representatives from Kosova/o and Yugoslavia. Representatives from Kosova/o were 
from all political and military parts and were the high level of representation. We 
must notice that Kosovar’s have make one mistake because they didn’t include in
68 Odraz vesti. B 92. 022499/1. ( In English: Daily News Service. B92. 024299/1.)
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their delegation members of national minorities, especially Turks and Muslims, 
whose support aspkations of Albanians. In other hand,· mostly minorities from 
Kosova/o composed the Yugoslav delegation, which apparently show unseriously 
taken by them.
The first phase of Conference was from 6-23 February 1999,when was one maximal 
activity of international community especially by USA.USA Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright, during these time was two time actively present.
The main claims of Kosova’s delegation were three: l.Guarante for Referendum after 
interim phase; 2.NATO troops to came in Kosova/o; and 3. Preservation of structure 
of KLA as a defense force of Kosova/o.^^.In other side these claim were unaccepted 
points for Yugoslav delegation. Both side in one or other manner have accept the 
status of Kosova/o within the FRY.
In 23 February is finished first phase of Conference, the aspect of implementation will 
be discussed at 15 March. Representatives from Kosova/o have accept the offered 
project from Contact Group, but signing will be after two weeks, after the 
consultations with the political and military factors of Kosova/o. Yugoslav delegation 
didn’t accept the offered plan.
After these begun the reaction from international community about Conference.Thus 
US President Bill Clinton described the talks as having produced more progress than
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had been seen in the decade since Kosova/o was stripped of its autonomy. The Head 
of OSCE, Wollebek emphases that now exist one political framework for future status 
of Kosova/o7* EU expresses their assurance that agreement will be signed at 15 
March and called sides in conflicts to due that. Who sign will benefit, who not will be 
punished.^^Also same request has had General Secretary of NATO. The Conference 
of Rambuilled,respectivly the end of first phase has two side, in one side, she couldn’t 
resolve crises, in other hand, give possibility for finding solution next meeting.
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The conference came to an end, with what international mediators are describing as a 
partial peace deal, athough nothing has been actually signed P According to the 
agreement the Conference continue work at 15 March 1999 in Paris. The Kosovar 
representatives have declare that they accept the offered Agreement for interim 
solution of Kosova’s crisis and is able to sing.
Kosovars have sign Agreement at 18 .3 .1999 .In other hand, the Yugoslav side didn’t 
accept the offered Agreement and claim for continuing of negotiations. This claim 
was unacceptable for Kosovar’s and international community. Thus at 
19.3.199.publicly is declared that Conference on Kosova/o has fall with the
responsibility of Yugoslavs.75
Informatori Ditor Nr. 2333b dt.8.2.1999. ( In English: Daily information. Np.2333b dt.8.2.1999.) 
B92. No. 022499/1 dt.24.2.1999.
B92 No. 022499/1. Dt.24.2.1999.
Deklarata e EU mbi Konferencen e Rambujes.Informatori ditor Nr.2341a, dt. 24.2. 1999. QIK. 
Prishtine. (In English: EU Statement about the Conference in Rambuillet. Daily Information. 
No.2341a. Dt. 24.2. 1999. KIC. Prishtina.)
73 B92. No. 022499/1. Dt.24.2.1999
74 Daily Information. No.2363C. dt.18.3.1999. 
”  CNN, BCC, Reuters dt. 18.3.1999.
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The last attempts of international community to pursued Millosevic were through 
special envoy of USA Hoolbroke. After failing long negotiations Holbroke declare: 
’Tve mentioned to Milosevic about the consequences, he knows all, but he didn’t 
accept”. After failing the negotiations, in 23.3.1999.ai'ound 24 o’clock General 
Secretary of NATO, Havier Solana , declares: ”I’ve give order for strike against 
Yugoslavia..”’  ^ In the evening of 24.3.1999.around 21.09 min. beginning NATO 
strike against Yugoslavia. NATO strikes have been for 78 days long with successThis 
strike prove the words of USA President Clinton: ”If Milosevic have no will tocreated
peace, we have will to stop his war”.78
78
CNN 23.3.1999. BCC dt. 23.3.1999.
CNN, BCC dt. 23.3.1999. 23:55 h.
CNN, BCC form the US President. Clinton, addresation to American nation, dt.23.3.1999. 17:00 h.
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CHAPTER V.THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS 
CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE
1. The right to self-determination for Kosova/o
The principle of self-determination represents one of the most important principles of 
temporary international law. From the appearance of this principal, self-determination 
have dream and hope for million persons around the world, which were under 
pressure. Only after the Second World War this principle begun to be reality. The 
right of national self-determination is attractive therefore ,because it appears both to 
recognize the right of people to live according· to there own culture and to be 
consistent with required by or synonymous with the principle of democracy/
Until the years 1989-90,the principle of self-determination (‘expression of the free 
will’) had been dormant and were meant to be applied only within the colonial context 
and the practice of the time shows that this was in fact the case. This does not mean 
that there were no legal bases for its application outside the colonial context. Witness
* Michael Freeman, National self-determination. Peace and Human rights. 'Peace Review'. Vol.lO. 
No.2 June, 1998. p. 162.
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to this is the 1970 Declaration that provided for its application even within existing 
states not representing the will of the entire population.
The collapse of communism elsewhere reactualised the principle in its harshest 
version. In democratic states case of realization of self-determination are solved easy. 
Thus, was the cases of divided between Norway and Sweden, Checkolovalia etc. The 
independence has been by the political will of people, and it is solved without any 
troubles. In other hand, in despotic and hegomonistic states, the political will of 
peoples for independence is pressed by arms, like in Soviet Union, Yugoslavia etc.
Besides its legal aspect, the issue of self-determination invariably involves the other 
sides of the story: it’s political, geostrategic, and security aspect. In fact the last aspect 
of the issue a intrinsic part of the political principle of self-determination and its real 
exercise in practice. Aware of its very heavy political nature, the international 
community after the Cold War tried to sort of impact its future ramifications by giving 
some guidelines on how the political principle of self-determination should be 
exercised and at the some time, denying the right to those ethnicity’s that exercised it 
in a different way from that provided for them.
Unfortunately, Kosova/o during the Cold War, was under communist state. Following 
of this fact the will of people of Kosova/o for self-determination is merged by 
communist’s standards. In these countries, it was believed that the classical Marxist
101
thought had been very mindful about the principle and the right of all peoples to self- 
determination.^
The ideas of Stalin and Lenin on the 'class-type' right to self-determination of peoples 
had great impact upon the models for solving the national questions within former 
communist countries.^ Based on this, there had been set up the legal-political and 
constitutional-dogmatic concepts regarding the various forms for solving of the 
national questions in these countries, such as the federal-type republics and other 
legal- political entities not of a federal-type nature (autonomous republic, autonomous 
provinces and autonomous regions).The communist parties, as avanguards of the 
working class, decided on who was to be a nation and who a "nationality"(in fact 
minority),that is, who was entitled to the federal-type republic and who to that of non- 
federal-type entity (autonomous republic, autonomous province and autonomous 
region).“* The right to self-determination "up to secession" was deemed to belong only 
to the federal-type republics,notwithstanding whether that right was provided 
expressly in the Constitution of a given country. In some cases, that right was 
explicitly foreseen(former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia),while in the others not 
(former Yugoslavia).
In the latter's case, the right to self-determination and its exercise during the Second 
World War was considered to have brought into being the former (Communist)
■ Petrie Ernest, Pravica do somoodlocbe. Maribor-Slovenia. 1984. pp. 241-247.) In English; Petrie 
Ernest, The right for self-determination. Maribor-Slovenia. 1984. pp. 241-247.)
Ibler Vladimir, Pravo naroda na samoodredienje I zloupotreba tog prava."Politieka misao".Vol.XXIX 
No.2/92. Zagreb. pp.53-55.(plot).
Cf. Krykov, Miehael, Self-determination from Marx to Mao."Ethnie and Raeial Studies". Vol.l9. 
No.2 April, 1996. pp.352-357.
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Yugoslavia as a common state of equal nations and nationalities, its republics and the 
autonomous provinces of Kosova and Vojvodina. ^
The self-dissolution of former Communist federation after the end of Cold War has 
exactly been attributed to the anti-democratic and repressive nature of the regions 
based on Communist values as a described above. To prevent the effects of an 
anarchy caused by the action of centrifugal forces within these States, the central 
governments at the outset attempted to legally 'regulate' this process of self- 
destruction whereby there came to for a the hegemonic tendencies on the part of a 
bigger nations, especially in the former Soviet Union(the Russians) and 
Yugoslavia(the Serbs.^
The said attempts for a "constitutional self-destruction" were completely based on the 
classical interpretation of the communist values about the self-determination of the 
peoples and their right to independent statehood, whereby only the federal-type 
republics enjoyed that right notwithstanding their ethnic composition and the way 
they were established.
The principle of self-determination has been differently interpreted, by the 
international community in its response to the process of self-destruction in 
communist countries. The European Union(the than European Communityjhad been 
the first to got involved. It based its initial response to the dissolution of former 
communist federations on the political principle of self-determination. The right to
5 The Preamble of the Constitution of 1974 of the former Yugoslavia and its articles 1 and 5.
 ^ Cassese, Antonio, Self-determination of peoples and the Recent Break up to USSR and 
Yugoslavia.Essays in Honor of Wang Tieya. 1994. by Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 131-141).
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"expression of a free will", as a reference point to solving the self-determination 
disputes, was according to the EU deemed to belong only to those living within the 
federal-type republics. The other entities were denied the right to "expression of the 
free will" meaning the independent statehood.
This EU stance was sanctioned in the opinions of its Arbitration Commission, at the 
outset named as a Committee, set up within the framework of the Hague Conference 
on Yugoslavia.(September 1991) and in the Guidelines on Recognition of New States 
in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union of 16 December 1991/ From these 
documents, there could be inferred that the EU considered the principle and its 
application to be compatible with the rule of law, democracy and human and minority 
rights. Practically, this meant that its application short of independent statehood on 
behalf of the non-federal type entities was designed to provide for nothing more than 
right to a certain special status regime. Thus, EU in one manner has accept the facts 
foreseen by communist constitutions. This is notice in the first opinion of the Badinter 
Commission of November 1991,expressed;"the Constitution is only a mere fact". 
From these conclusions of EU is demanded the right of Albanians from Kosova/o for 
self-deternnination.
From the time of division of Kosova/o from Albanian, the Albanian people of 
Kosova/o have aspirated always for their identity, for equal status or for national 
unification. After the Albanian nation was divided in 1912-13 a new Albanian state 
was eventually forced living outside its borders almost half of its population that
’ For full text of the Badinter's Commission opinions available in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia 
through documents...pp.415-418; 474-481; 634-640.
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constituted a majority in the areas they lived. Albaninans were the largess minority, 
even larger then one of the constituent nations of the Kingdom of SCS (the Slovenes).
After the Second World Wai‘, there were held an Assembly in the Prizren city of 
Kosova in such it was decided that Kosova be a part of the Federal Serbia. And was 
so-called 'political territorial autonomy' in 1946. The legal- political status of Kosova 
changed during the time Communist Yugoslavia existed. The changes were made in 
1963 and, after it, in 1974 whereby Kosova/o was granted a wide political autonomy 
from Belgrade, meaning wide status competencies and right almost identical with 
those of the former Yugoslav republics. Yet, the right to secession was not granted 
to it, since that right was not granted to the others federal units.
By the Constitution of 1974 Kosova did have its own identity, own territory(article 5 
of the Constitution) and in the field of international relations(article 271 of the Federal 
Constitution).Kosova/o did conclude two international type-agreements with the than 
German Democratic Republic and the World Bank respectively.^ Kosova/o was 
entitled to establish "national Bank (art.262) to levy taxes (art.265) etc. In addition to 
these extensive rights, Kosova/o was equality represented within the organs of the 
Federation, including the than Federal Presidency(art.321).
A new Kosovar Albanian identity way to establishing their own identity, legal and 
political started on July 2,1990 whereby the Kosova/o Assembly passed
* See more chapter III
’ Texts of the agreements and related acts were published in the Official Gazette of Kosova/o. 
No. 12/72; 3/77; 24/77 and 34/78.
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Constitutional declaration, requiring that Kosova/o and its majority population be 
threaten as equal as the others in former Yugoslavia. Few month after words, on 7 
September 1990,Kosova/o Assembly adopted a new Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosova/o, based on the political principle of self-determination and sovereign 
equality. A year later, on 26-30 September 1991,tha majority of the Kosova/o 
population held referendum as an expression of the free will, that is, in accordance 
with the political principle of self-determination.
It was shortly afterwards that the than EC, through the than Badinter Committee, and 
the UN recognized the fact that former Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution. 
Kosova/o as well, together with others wanting independence, submitted its 
application for international recognition on 21 December 1991,respecting the 
procedure required by the EU Guidelines of 16 December 1991.yet,no positive 
response was given.
In theory, it is written that the rejection of Kosova/o application for independent 
statehood was due to its non-fulfillment of the basic international criteria for 
independent statehood, that is, the lack of effective control over Kosova's territory by 
the majority population and their governmental structures set up on the eve of former
Yugoslav's dissolution. 10
Cf. Warbrick, Collin, Current developments. Public International Law. Recognition of 
States."International and Comparative Law Quartely".Vol.41 Part.2 April 1992 .p.480.
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From Badinter's opinions and the other international documents regarding the crisis in 
former Yugoslavia can be drawn a conclusion that the entities with a clear territorial 
bases at the time of dissolution would have been recognized if they had a firm control
over their territory. This stance was based not as much on legal-moral arguments as 
on geostrategic and political ones, that is, to prevent the violent um'aveling of the
crisis and its impact on neighboring countries 1 1
The international community must take into account the rise and fall of former 
Yugoslavia its internal structure and units that coniposed. Also former Yugoslavia has 
case to exist and the right for succession hasn’t recognize any former republics of 
former Yugoslavia, not also to new state of FRY created in 1992. This fact is declared 
also by the main international organizations ,such are,UN. EU and World Bank. Also 
the FRY(Serbia and Montenegro),including the former Autonomous province of 
Vojvodina, held no referendum as an 'expression of the free will of the population'. 
Albanians from Kosova/o historically appeared as one particular ethnic colectivity. 
They have had always their compact ethnic territory with the majority of Albanian 
populations
In legal aspect the independence of Kosova/o after the dissolution of former
‘' Cf. Weller, Marc, The international response to the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. American Jurnal of International Law;Vol..86 No.3 July, 1992. pp.569-607.
107
recognized by the all legal acts of federation at that time. The right for self- 
determination of one people within the defined trritory, like Kosova/o is not only 
natural right, but also ethnic and democratic right according to the temporary 
principles of international law. Current insistence of Kosovar Albanian's for 
independence are based on the democratic majorytarian principle, as well as on their
residence in Kosova/o for more than a millenium. 12
The right of Kosovar Albanians for self-determination up to secession must see thi'ee 
main issue; First, how this people has entered under juridicary of other state, Serbia, 
by will of forcedly? Second, how has been treatment of this people from this state, 
human or repressive? Third, this people have express own free will to remain under 
that state or for separation?'^ Serbia conquers Kosova/o in 1912 after the Balkans 
Wars forcely, by occupation. In Kosova/o during the 87 years of Serbian domination 
the treatment of Kosovar Albanians has been repressive and genocidal.
From history is known that nations wont to divide where the national pressure can 
made live together absolutely unacceptable. In such case the denying of right for self- 
determination up to secession of these nations, is attempt to preserve the privileges of 
conquered nation by the police methods in place of democratic one.'"* Serbian regime 
by its brutal violation and genocide, esspecially last time, has lost any rights to lead 
with Kosova/o and their people.
'■ Warren Zimmerman:The Demons of Kosova...p.5.
‘’Blerim Reka, Pravo na samoopredeljenje albanskog naroda na Kosovo. Prishtine, 1998. p.5.( In 
English: Blerim Reka, The right for self-determination fo the Albanian people of Kosova/o. Prishtina, 
1998. p.5.)
Zejnullah Gruda, E dreita e vetevendosies se popuive."E drejta". Nr. 2. 1996 Prishtine. p.8. ( 
Zejnullah Gruda. The right of people for self-determination. "Law". No.2. 1996. Prishtina, p.8.)
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In Kosova/o, Albanian people in 1991 by Referendum, massivly and publicly is 
declared for independence. Thus, national, demogrphic and territorial reality of 
Albanians of Kosova/o and their historic, geografic and political identity can 
justificated the reason for equality and freedom in their independent state.
Kosova/o and his people forcefully have remain under Yugoslavia, because of lack of 
force and lack of willingness of international community to support them. When 
Kosova/o created force able for secession and when international community will 
support political will of Kosovar’s for independence, then dream of Kosovar’s can be 
reality.
A major argument for secession is based on the notion that a people who did not 
consent to be included in particular state has the moral right to decide by itself and for 
itself whether it wants to stay within the imposed boundai'ies.*^ In the end, in favor of 
the right of Kosovar’s for self-determination is also statement of Le Rio Jones: "The 
landscape should belong to the people who see it all the time".
2. Economic viability of Kosova/o
Many opponents of the right of secession through self-determination argue that to 
confer the right of independent statehood o every people, however small, would create
Benjamin Neuberger, National self-determination: Dilemmas of a concept. "Nation and 
nationalism".Vol.l Part.3. November, 1995. p.313.
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thousands of non-viable states. Basically, the opponents of small states argue thiamin- 
states lack the military power to defend themselves , have insufficient political 
standing to make their independence meaningful, and cannot use economies of scale 
to achieve development and wealth. People cannot live by sovereignty alone/^ For 
this aim in short I’ll describe the Kosovas ability of economy for validity where its 
economy is the source of the others attributes which the state needs for validity.
The Kosova’s economy in the stage after the second World War was developed under 
the social-economic system of former Yugoslavia. During this time the development 
of . Kosova/o was in dependence of political .social and economical 
state(position).After 1966 and till 1989 Kosova/o begun the first phase of 
industrialization, and in that time, Kosova/o improve well its political, social and 
economical state in comparison with the other places of e,\-Yugoslavia. After 1960 
the initial phase of industry operating begun, as the only and important branch of 
economy. Till then, but and later, Kosova’s wealth have been used in that way that its 
minerals and the others to serve as the raw material for existing capacities and for 
export to improve the building all over ex-Yugoslavia or for export to improve the 
marketing balance and payments of ex-federate Yugoslavia/^
Industry and mineralogy show the most important nucleus that is the strongest in 
forming the social product and the national future, they are the main carriers for the
B. Neuberger, National self-determination. p.314.
Musa Limani, Politika Ekonomike. Prishtine, 1996. p.59.( In English; Musa Limani, Policy of 
Ekonomy. Prishtina, 1996. p.59.)
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bigger employment and for the higher accumulation.’® Industry and mineralogy show 
the main complex in Kosova/o’s economy. Kosova/o’s industry and mineralogy have 
the short history of development. Although in this stage from two decades, in words 
complex become known for ex-Yugoslavia and for the world.
The geological searching till now made a fact that Kosova/o is wealthy with so many 
kinds of minerals and the other underground wealth. WeTl name only some of the 
most important minerals that Kosova/o has:
Coal-Kosova/o is very wealthy with coal. From the newest geological searching, its 
considerate that reserves of coal in Kosova/o are about 12-15 billion tone.*  ^From this 
natural wealth ,in Obiliq(near Prishtina) are built termocentrales ” A” with instálate 
capacity of 794 MWh and termocentral ‘’B” with instálate capacity of 6761 MWh. 
Exploitation of coal is still on the surface. Lead and zinc-Kosova/o is quite wealthy 
with these minerals. In Kosova/o is the biggest mine in Europe for this kind of metals.
This minerals are exploit in Mitrovica, in known factory ‘Trepca” . The other most 
known mines are,Stantergu, Ajvalia, Kishnica and Novoberda. KosovaO/o has had 
50% of all balanced reserves of lead and zinc in ex-Yugoslavia..^°.In ‘Trepca” also 
explode and minerals of silver and gold Nickel-From the searching, it is thought that 
reserves of nickel are about 20 million tone. This mineral exploit in Kosova/o after
Nysret Gacaferri, Ekonomia. Prishtine, 1997. p.23.( In English: Nysret Gacaferri, Economy. 
Prishtina, 1997. p.23.)
Musa Limani, Politika Ekonomike. p.72 
Nysret Gacaferri, Ekonomia. p.43.
Kadrush Berisha, Mineralet e Kosoves. Prishtine, 1996. p.24. ( In English: Kosova/o's minerals. 
Prishtina, 1996. p.24.)
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building of “Feronikel” factory in Glogovc, near- Prishtina. Also Kosovas wealthy 
with mineral of Bauxite, Chromium, metal, magnesium etc
Supporting on raw materials and on installation capacities, the development of 
industry and mineralogy, Kosova/o has real conditions and space for further 
development, it means that till now has just begin to exploit the elementary
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possibilities without achieving the nearest optimum.""
Agriculture - Kosova/o includes a surface of 1.1 million-hectare (10.908 km2). Farm 
surfaces are about 553.046 ha or 50.3%."^ Kosova’s agriculture is characterized with 
extensive degree of producing. Land present an important wealth, because position 
and pédologie composition, make possible high products. There exists a good natural 
condition for developing a modern intensive form. Animal husbary the same has a 
tradition in Kosova/o because there exits conditions for developing this farming 
branch.
Silviculture-as an economic branch in Kosova/o it doesn’t show any particular 
economic potential From the general found of forests of this branch 81.4% are 
leafless forests, and only 18.6% conifer forests, that doesn’t show any good potential 
for developing wood industry.
■"Instituti Ekonoinik(ed),. Perspektivat e zhvillimit ekonomik te Kosoves Prishtine, 1998. p.79. ( In 
English; Economic Institute (ed). The Perspectives of economic development of Ksova/o. Prishtina, 
1998. p.79.)
Bajrush Kabashi, Buiqesia. Prishtine, 1995. p.l2. ( In English: Bajrush Kabashi,
Agriculture. Prishtina. 1995. p. 12.)
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Water-in Kosova/o is very important element to organize the economic life and for 
farm producing. Kosova/o is poor with surface water, though exists some rivers, 
especially in Plain of Dugagjini. To complete lack of water, some artificial lakes are 
built. It is known “Iber-Lepenc” and “Radoniq” system.
Tourism-Kosova/o doesn’t have good conditions to develop the summer tourism, 
because it doesn’t have sea, but it has some other natural conditions that offer an 
possibility for developing winter tourism sport and recreative/forests of Sharr,Alpet 
Shqiptare etc.) and other cultural, ethnographical and historical monuments etc. On 
Albanian Alpa's side that belongs to Kosova/o, and on Sharer are about 20 localities 
with paths capacity about 130 thousand skiers. '^'
From attractions can be mentioned Gryka e Rugoves (Rugova’s Canyon),source of 
Drini I Bardhe, Shpella e Mermerit/Marble Cave) in Gadinie near Prishtina, waterfalls 
of Mii'usha’s river etc. Kosova/o has sources of termominerals water that offers 
tourists possibilities like Peja’s, Kllokot’s and Mitrovica’s spas, which have quality of 
water that can be comprised with the most known spas and the same in the region.
Craftwork and art-in Kosova/o have had their tradition from the antique time and 
had shown the important economic activities. Their role were bigger after the second 
WW then when developing of industry was low, in which case craft did the filling of
Economic Institute, Perspectives...p.89.
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some industrial products, and the forming tools. Today craft show interesting branch 
in Kosova/o’s economy.
Diaspora-it’s a big source of Kosova’s economy. During the years from 1990,it was a 
carrier of economic life in Kosova/o. Solution of Kosova’s problem would make that 
rich people from Diaspora invest in Kosova/o, in their place, with whole their 
capacity of capital.
Because of the big nattily and the structure of the youth ages the active people in 
Kosova/o is on the increase population. Kosova/o with its natural wealth and with its 
population capacity is enough source for economic validity and for good and bigger 
prosperity of region.
3. Security and legal-political aspects of the claim
The matter of Kosova/o today is known as a matter with the height tension about 
peace and the war in Balkan and elsewhere. After several years of on unstable status 
quo, during the past two years the Kosova/o crisis entered a dangerous phase as a 
consequence of several factors. Kosova/o has become a burring issue not only for the 
stability of the south Balkans, but also for the credibility of European security and the
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future of the Atlantic alliance. Kosova/o remains the center of crisis in southeastern
Europe, which threatens to spark regional conflagration 2 5
To understood the importance of the Kosova/o matter today and in the future as well, 
should understand the whole importance between the Albanian and Serbia nation in 
Balkan, as two largest nation among Balkan relations with less importance then the 
other nation relation in Balkan for peace, stability and corporation with this part of the 
south eastern Europe.
The Kosova/o importance for peace and stability on the region can be seem from it’s 
geostrategic position to which was already historically present. At the end of the last 
century the Serbian geographer and enthnolog Jovan Cvijic had given a conclusion 
having a good look at the Balkan map: ’’Who owns Kosova/o controls not only Serbia 
but the whole central region of Balkan, we have to du with one of the most strategic 
position of Balkan” .^  ^ Cvijic’s attitudes on the Kosova/o importance in the Serbian 
geopolicy affected on and security the Serbian national program during the 19 century 
and furthermore.
■Tansuz Bugajski, Kosova between war and independence:Implications for international security. 
Speache in the International conference: ”Democratic,security and regional stability”. Tirana. 
February, ! 999.
Jorgos Smakos, Athina zbulon sekretin e luftes ne Kosove. Gazeta "Fakti". 24 Dhjetor, 1998. 
Nr.219. Shkup. p. 10. ( In English: Jorgos Smakos, Athens discover the war secret of Kosova/o. "Fakti" 
.24 December, 1998. No.219. Shkup. p.lO)
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dimensions on the bases of the human rights and on the bases of the international 
peace and security defense^^. The war for the independence and self-determination 
should considered the United Nations interest on protecting the peace and security as 
well as the other rights that come out of the UN acts. This is the reason for the 
Kosovar Albanian demands of this matter.
On the solution of the Kosova/o problem and on its realization of it’s rights for self- 
determination three factors have the primary role: Kosova/o Albanian, Serbia and 
international community, which can achieve on optimal results on this crisis. The 
interests of the thi'ee factors should be considered on the problem’s solution. In the 
literature and on the practice on the post cold war years is said that the Kosova/o 
independence will put in danger the peace and security on the region. Up to date 
reasons for not knowing Kosova/o as on indepenent country based on the peace and 
stability protection on the region.
Among the potential risky regions from the Kosova’s independence FYROM as taken 
the main peace on the international agendas. The fear from the Macedonian 
destabilize should leave once forever based on the simply fact that the lost of 
Kosova/o Albanian will probably have as the consequence the new FYROM risk. 
Looking from the terminal juridical-aspect the self-determination of the Kosovar 
Albanian for the Sovran and independent country from the result of the 1991 
Referendum any person or subject is not allowed to decide or ask for any other
Lubivoje Acimovic, Princip somoopredeljenja I problem Kosova. Beograd, 1998.p.6. ( In English: 
Lubivoje Avcimovic, The principle of self-determination and Kkosova/o’s problem. Beograd,
1998.p.6)
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solution then the first one. The same is valid for smaller request as well. With that 
Referendum, respectively with the recognition and respecting its results nobody in the
region or in FYROM will be on risk.
The peace and stability protection on the region with not knowing Kosva/0 as an 
independent country meaning very day is turning on its contrary more and more. 
Exactly not knowing the Kosova independence represent the main destabilize. From 
different reasons under the shadow of the regional stability protection the full 
Kosova/o independence can be postponed for some time, but it can hardly be deleted 
the Kosova matter on this direction as an essentially democratic solution in Balkan.
With the rights for self-determination of Kosova’s in front of the countries around 
juridical philosophy thought can be linked: ”Qui iure suo utitur nemin facit 
iniuram”
The Albanian nation of Kosova/o now is asking only the rights for their own peace in 
Balkan and to Uve free out in harmony with his neighbors.^^ The core of the 
temporary problem of national self-determination is that the political world is still 
organized by the principle that its primary agents are states and its primary purpose is
peace, 30
The long term and stable solution of the Kosova/o matter doesn’t result only on the 
limitation of the “peace oaza” matter but with the closed cooperation with the justice.
G.Zajmi, Vepra 1. p. 180.
Edith Durham, Brenga e Ballkauit. Tirane, 1991.p.426. ( In English: Edith Durham, Balkans 
Concern. Tirana, 1991. p.426).
Michael Freeman, National Self-determination, p. 160
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Peace doesn’t have an meaning without justice as that is, it is fragile and imposed. 
The insisting of the Serbian regime was through Kosova/o to hold almost half of the 
Albanian nation in Balkan under political domination with the wider repression it 
exaggerates the Albanian-Serbia conflict decision in Balkan and represents the 
permanent source of the destabilize on the region. It’s the Milosevic’s policy the one 
who did destabilize and goes on holding the region like that. It should be clear that 
Milosevic remained the principal obstacle to a solution and that no agreement can be
possible as long as he remained in power. 31
At the last time after the Serb aggression on Kosova/o and it’s armed resistance of it’s 
population begin, the idea that the recognition of the Kosova/o independence in the 
only way to stop the Serbian explosion and the destroyment of the project for the great 
Serbia started to be crystallized.
The permanent self-confidence deployment is necessary on Serbian society that 
Serbia with Kosova/o is not a great and strong Serbia, but weak Serbia in the 
democratic aspect as well in the international prestige. The Kosova/o division from 
Serbia would help in the Serbian democratization as well, otherwise the appetites for 
military activity is one criminal organization with increase every day/^ “When the 
ordinai-y Serbs learn to think more critically and humanly about Kosova/o, and more 
critically about some of their national myths, all the people of Cassava/o and Serbia 
will benefit-not least the Serbs themselves".
Warren Zimmerman, The Demons..p.l 1.
Jansuz Bugajski, Kosova between war and independence, p.5. 
N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short Hstory. p.356.
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The literature writes that on the 100 year' war between France and England, Han Dai'k 
had said: ”As for the peace with English, the only way is for them to return back into 
their place in England” .^ “* If it can be paraphi'ased and adopted this saying on the 
concrete conditions of the present relation between Serbia and Kosova/o, it could said 
that as for the friendship between this two countries the only way to achieve it is for 
the Serbian authorities based on the political wish of the dominant majorities of the 
Kosova/o population,to withdrew from Kosova/o and recognized it as one 
independent and Sovran country of all its citizens. This action will have a great effect 
on peace and stability on the region.fCesante causa,cessât effectus).
Serbs will never understand the nature of Kosova/o questions unless they recognize 
first the territory conquered in 1912 already had a majority non-serbian population 
and, secondly that the experience of alien, colonial rule is precisely what Serbian
policy inflict on that majority population during most of the next eighty-five years. 35
The idea for a short time transit solution of Kosova/o which understands some sort of 
international protectorate the Albanian civic institutions and fully withdrawal of the 
military and police Serbian forces could create stability on the region. This option is 
directly linked with the situation after the NATO bombing. This is one form for 
creation of the stability of the region and the real way for the fulfillment of the 
NATO-s aim. Otherwise, the option for the recognition of the Kosova/s right for 
statehood is must be the option for the last solution of the Kosova/o’s crisis.
Bernard Joseph, Nationalitv-its nature and problems.London. Copyright © George Alen. 1990. 
p.l90.
N.Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, p.356.
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In context of the realization of the right for self-determination in fi’ont of the regional 
stability, are useful the words of the Serbia Academic Dobrica Cosic, who is 
considered as the father of Serbian nation, which said; ’’Self-determination is the first 
principle of the any democratic solution... until this value is not respect, we will have 
war and unforeseen tragedy”.
36 Borba. 20-21. March, 1993.
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4. Arguments against Kosova/o’s right for statehood
The right of the Kosovar Albanians for self determination and secession primarily was 
opposed from Serbia trying to find base for this negation on the Law and international 
principles. Here will compare the thesis of negation of the Kosovar Albanians for the 
right of self-determination and the right of Kosova to be sovereign and an independent 
state, answering with the contra arguments in the same time.
I. Kosova is a Serbian territory and do not have the right for secession.
Fkst, this thesis have no basis on the actual national structure, either in the past. This 
statement mainly is referred to the history and even in this direction has no ground. 
Having in mind a authoktony of the Albanians in Kosova as a direct descendents of the 
lUirians, in other hand the Slavic movement into the South, including here and a Serbs, 
this possessive stand is with no base in the aspect of historical material truth. Historic 
notes are talking always about the majority of the Albanians in Kosova. If the history 
would be a criteria, regardless contemporary national-territorial realities, Hungary would 
have the right on the Yugoslav part of Panonia, Bulgaria and Hungary would be 
expanded till near the Belgrade, Greece will take Istanbul, Albania the town of Yannina 
in Greece, etc.
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Kosova have had it's own legal-constitutional, national and territorial individuality in the 
former Yugoslavia. Kosova was as a "corpus separatum" , it wasn’t part of Serbia, but it 
was under her constitution. Such a political and constitutional solutions are not identical. 
In fact, instead of the "secession" could be only "disassociation"
The second thesis, Kosovar Albanians are national minority and they have no right of 
the self-determination and statehood.
Albanian people of Kosova comprised neaidy half of the Albanian nation in the Balkans 
and is divided by force in the Balkan Wars. Albanians in Kosova are not only some 
thousands or ten thousands, but they are two million. In a former Yugoslavia, they have 
been among the biggest nationalities, after the Serbs and the Croats, Albanians have
37
Gazmend Zajmi, Vepra..... p.22.
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behind thu’d. With number and with territorial condense they can not be qualified as a 
minority, when they comprised a absolute majority of the population in one territory with 
the distinguished characteristics national, historical, geographical, individuality.
Third, Kosova haven't been a unit, political entity by the decisions of the AVNOJ, when 
was created the second, communist Yugoslavia.
This thesis was popular during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Regarding to 
this thesis, only those who were creators, those have the right for dissolution, secession. 
It's true that Kosova wasn't mentioned in the AVNOJ documents, with the intention find 
resolution later. Kosova/o's territory also was not included in anyone federal units in the 
AVNOJ's decisions, so neither was included in a Serbia. From the theoretical and empiric 
aspect, it is jio important for a federal or confederal unit, participated or not in a creation 
of that unit. However, constitutionally legally it's no important did existed or not as a 
political entity during the creation of the federation or confederation. USA during its 
creation were 13 units, now 53, Canada had 4, now 10. Soviet Union in the time of the 
creation through a federal contract of the 1922 had 4 units, then had 15 republics and 
during the dissolution aU of them had a right for independence. Individualism and 
equality are limited only within the short period of the constitution of one federal state
composition.
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Forth, Kosova/o will adjoin to Albania
Historical, ethnic-national collectivities in a multiethnic states never gave up from their 
national aspirations for individuality and national equality. Such a case is also and the 
effort of Kosovar Albanians. Is no doubt that Albanian national unity has priority 
through democratic ways of the new organized order and the integration of Europe. 
To illustrate such priority we are giving an example about the Serb National Question 
from the Belgrade newspaper "Pohtika” . "It has been always a natural right of every 
people to hve together, or at least to try to live together in a joint cultural and a state 
territory."
Fifth, One people can not have two states
This thesis that "one people can not have more than one state" opposed simply the case 
of Germany and Italy before the unification's, or cases such are Germany, Austria, 
Luxembourg, both Koreas, Vietnams, Jemens, Romania and Moldavia, Greece and 
Cyprus, Turkey and Cyprus, Bangladesh and West Bengal. The existence of the state of 
Albania doesn't represent obstacle for Kosovars to have the second republic. There 
where they are a majority, or adjoin to the existed state, or as a independent state.
Radovan Pavic, Resenje za Kosovo, Rilindja, 5.VIII.1990. (In English: Radovan Pavic, Solution for 
Kosova/o. Rilindja. 5 August, 1990.)
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The fact that Kosova wasn't in position to make independence in practice, thus was hot 
dispute which push the international community and Serbia to think and propose 
solutions disregarding independence. During recent year's international bodies were more 
oriented to "special status" I'aither recognizing the pohtical will of the Kosovtr/o's people 
for independence of Kosova.
It is no doubt that " special status " means better position for life of Kosova/o's 
population, but even this solution can not resolve Kosova/o's question for a long term 
period, or in a stable way. In this case, if Kosova/o should belong, or include to one 
state, or another, so why Kosova shouldn't be included in Albania when we have
interethnic relations Albanian-Serb 10; 1 in Albanian favor. 39
As other proposal is the restitution of Kosova/o's autonomy. The offer of autonomy is no 
offer at all. It has outdated for a long time and more over, it would not guarantee the 
respect of Kosova Albanians civic and national rights.“’^  Kosovars believe autonomy has 
already been tried and was found wanting because it is insufficient to ensure Albanian 
rights and runs the risks of unilateral and illegal
revocation by Belgrade regime as in 1989. The restitution of Kosova/o's constitutional 
position under the Constitution of 1974 and whatever kind of autonomy is not anymore 
possible, because now doesn't exist the institutional framework of the multiethnic
.19 (Gazinend Zajmi;Op;cit.p.61).
(Fehmi Agani;LDK vicepresident, Bujku, December 1997).
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Yugoslav federation. The problem can not be resolved with autonomy, but simply might
be postponed in time. 41
A proposal with origin in Serbian unofficial circles is for partition of Kosova. Kosovar 
Albanians has the increasing birthrate, Serbs decreasing, because of a fear that Serbs in a 
next century might be minority even within Serbia, the chairman of Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Aits, Alexander Despic called in June 1996 for a public debate
on the idea of negotiating a "peaceful and civilized secession' for Kosova 42
After a option of controlling the all territory, partition of Kosova it seems to be more 
acceptable for Serbian circles. Lord David Owen say this in his book "The Balkan 
Odyssey", perhaps based on Serbian sources, that Serbs would agree on the partition of
Kosova based on where the resources are and disregarding on a monuments.4.1
Every attempt on partition of Kosova has no base on a real ethnic-territorial partition, 
because Albanian majority is represented in all macrozones and the high density of 
population, which can cause other problems. This option is supported only by some 
Serbian circles but not and from relevant international institutions. Meanwhile this option 
for Kosovar Albanians occurred to be as worst one.
42
Jorgo...op.cit.p.11)
NIN, 17 June 1996 
David Owen, The Balkan Odisey, 1996, p.42). 127
Father of America's independence John Adams write: "Independence wasn't our goal 
since the beginning. Enghsh injustice were pushed us to take arms in our hands... 
Hopeless that we would enjoy the King's goodness, who ai'e you, what you can be under 
English authority, except hostage beyond the law?"'"' Such situation is also and for 
Kosovar Albanians if they will remain under Serb-Yugoslav jurisdiction. The Kosovars 
preferred a settlement without doubt - independence from Yugoslavia.’''^  -
45
' Cf. Zejnullah Gruda; The right for self determination - Actual issues, Belgrade, 1998,p.6). 
Kosova spring... p. 108)
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS
Kosova/o has a central geographic position in the Balkan Peninsula. A small territory 
though, the geographic landscape of Kosova/o has always been of great geopolitical and 
geostrategic importance.
Kosova/o has an ethnic homogenous composition. The majority of the populations is 
Albanians, 90 %. Others are Serbs, Turks, Montenegrins, Romas etc. The Albanian 
people is one of the oldest in Europe. The Albanians are decadents of the Illyrians. They 
comprise one third of the Albanians living worldwide. Kosova/o and the Albanians of 
Kosova/o are the main pillar of the national center of the Albanians in former 
Yugoslavia. In Kosova/o live about 8 % Serbs. They have come to Kosova/o when the 
South Slavs moved into the Balkans. They are different from the Albanians, including 
their origins, language, culture and the history.
There have been many battles and wars in Kosova/o over the centuries, but until the last 
100 years or so none of them had the character of an " ethnic " conflict between the 
Albanians and the Serbs. The history among Albanians and the Serbs can be described as 
a history of conflict.
129
The Albanian people in their ethnic land in the former Yugoslavia throughout the history 
lived and functioned as an ethnic community with other parts of the Albanians in the 
Balkans.
On the crossroads of the Balkan Wai's, half of the Albanian nation and more than half of 
its territory was put outside the Albanian state. They were placed under the occupation by 
the neighboring Balkan States, mainly Serbia. The occupation of Kosova/o by Serbia 
was done by force and against the will of the Kosovar Albanians. During the Serbo- 
Croat-Slovene Kingdom, the territory of Kosova/o remained one administrative part of 
the State without any specific legal status, i. e. the Albanians were not recognized even as 
a national minority. Kosova/o after the Serb occupation in 1912 was a place of human 
hardship for the Kosovar Albanians who were threatened with extermination. The 
coloniziition program was a complex phenomenon serving a variety of aims, with its long 
term purpose of changing the national composition of the population of Kosova/o.
The Albanians who were reunited with Albania, during the Second World War, won 
some of their national rights. For Albanians it was a liberation from the brutal regime of 
Serbo-Croate-Slovene (later Yugoslav) Kingdom. After the Second World Wai', there 
was a difference in Kosovar Albanians position as compared to the prewar'Yugoslavia.
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This time official status of the Albanians and Kosova/o had been recognized by the 1946 
Constitution, although the policy of mass expulsion and repression continued unabated 
until 1966. A turning point in the status and the position of the Albanians in Yugoslavia 
came in 1966 with the fall of Rankovic, a leading proponent of Serb-centralism. The 
limited measures of liberalization following Rankovic’s dismissal were asked for the 
Kosovar Albanians who pressed for greater autonomy. According to the constitution of 
the former Yogoslavia of 1974, Kosova/o was a constituent element of the Yugoslav 
Federation with similar rights and duties as other federal units.
Milo she vie’s coming to power was a result of his claim against the Albanian rights for 
equal status within Yugoslavia. The abolishment of Kosova/o’s autonomy (1989) and the 
destruction of former Yugoslavia came as a result of his expansionist policies. His policy 
has made the tragedy of Yugoslavia and its people.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia entered into its final phase of dissolution 
by mid 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia enforced their declai'ations on independence and 
when the Yugoslav People Army intervened in order to preserve the territorial integrity 
of the country. The Kosova/o-Serbia conflict is not the main factor for dissolution of 
multinational federation of Yugoslavia, but it was the initial factor of its dissolution.
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In the constitutional sense, on the other hand, the unilateral changes to the status of 
Kosova/o and Vojvodina mai'k the beginning of the process of Yugoslavia’s violent 
disintegration. It marked the beginning of the radical change in the balance of power 
between the federal units in the former Yugoslavia with the open hegemonic tendency on 
Serbia’s side.
The dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the creation of new ch-cumstances was the 
most convenient political moment for the articulation and realization of the historic and 
legitimate aspirations of Kosova/o Albanians. The Albanian desire to break off from 
Serbia is not an aspiration born within the context of Yugoslavia’s breakdown. The roots 
of Albanian-Serbian mistrust run deep. Since 1912, when Kosova/o was occupied by 
Serbia after the Balkan Wars the Albanians always wanted to escape from Serbian rule 
and fought for it.
The National Referendum on Kosova/o as an Independent and Sovereign State presents 
an act of democratic, political self-determination of the Albanian people redefining the 
constitutional and political status of Kosova/o after the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia.
Following the abolition of Kosova/o’s autonomy in 1989, ethnic Albanians refused to
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accept the legitimacy of the Serbian rule, proclaimed Kosova/o as an Independent 
Republic and strongly advocated a peaceful strategy to resolve the Albanian - Serbian 
conflict. Since the early 1990s, the Albanians have been able to make decisions over a 
wide range of political, economic, social and cultural issues without interference from 
Serbia.
It is ironic that the Dayton Accord of 1995, which produced the uneasy peace to Bosnia, 
was the signaling event in the formation of an armed insurgence in Kosova/o. KLA is a 
result of permanent violence prepareted by Serbian forces against the Kosovars, as well 
a result of a long time unsuccessful pursued peaceful policy. The will of Kosovars, 
especially the youth, to live freely and independently from Serbia despite all the 
sacrifices should be taken into account as well. The appearance of the KLA on the 
political scene, raised hopes among the Albanians for liberation of Kosova/o from the 
Serbian regime.
“ We learned that violence works. It is the only way in this part of the world to achieve 
what you want and get the attention of the international community ”. This was the 
Declaration of an unnamed leader of KLA, which unfortunately was true. The United 
States has maintained the ‘ outer wall ‘ of sanctions, excluding Yugoslavia from 
international institutions, but until the Drenica massacre in early March 1998, did not
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apply any forceful pressure to resolve the Kosova/o issue. Europeans did less than this to 
force the peaceful solution of the Kosova/o crisis.
The principle of self-determination represents one of the most important principles of the 
contemporary international law. Besides its legal aspect, the issue of self-determination 
invariably involves the other side's story: its political, geostrategic and security aspect.
Kosova/o during the Cold War was under the Communist state. Following this fact, the 
will of the people of Kosova/o for self-determination was measured by communist 
standaids. The rejection of Kosova/o application for independent statehood, made after 
the end of the Cold War, was due to its non-fulfillment of the basic international criteria 
for independent statehood, that is, lack of effective control over Kosova/o’s territory by 
the majority population and their governmental structures set up on the eve of former 
Yugoslav’s dissolution. International community must take into account the rise and fall 
of former Yogoslavia its internal structure and units that composed its if it is to solve the 
issue in a proper way.
A major argument for secession is based on the notion that a people who did not consent 
to be included in a particular state has the moral right to decide by itself and for itself 
whether it wants to stay within the imposed boundaries. The Albanian nation of Kosova/o
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is now asking only the rights for their own peace in the Balkans and to Live free and in 
harmony with its neighbors. This should be respected by others.
The idea for a short time and transitional solution to the issue of Kosova/o which includes 
some sort of international protectorate over it, Albanian civic institutions and full 
withdrawal of the Serbian military and police forces could create stability on the region. 
Yet, it is not the definite solution to the problem. The proper solution, if it is to be a long- 
lasting and stable one should take into account the will and the interests of the majority 
population living in Kosova/o, that is, the will and the interests of the Kosovar Albanians.
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